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FOREWORD 
This  paper i s  a  r e s u l t  o f  c o l l a b o r a t i o n  between the  authors and the  
I I A S A  p r o j e c t  on r i s k  assessment i n  hazardous waste management. It was 
p a r t  o f  a  m u l t i p l e  c o l l a b o r a t i o n  i'n the  Netherlands. The I I A S A  p r o j e c t  
compared i n s t i t u t i o n a l  approaches t o  r e g u l a t i o n  o f  hazardous wastes i n  
several count r ies ,  i n c l u d i n g  the  USA, UK, FRG, A u s t r i a  and Hungary. I n  
l i n e  w i t h  previous I I A S A  r i s k  research, i t  focussed i n  p a r t i c u l a r  upon 
the  i n t e r a c t i o n s  between the  forms o f  r i s k  ana lys is ,  t he  techn ica l  regu la to ry  
instruments employed (such as hazard c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s ) ,  and the  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  
processes o f  r e g u l a t i o n  i n  those count r ies .  
The i n f l uence  o f  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  processes upon techn ica l  knowledge 
used i n  r e g u l a t i o n  has been i nc reas ing l y  recognized. However, i t  has y e t  
t o  be adequately systematized i n  comparative research on d i f f e r e n t  regula-  
t o r y  systems. I n s t i t u t i o n a l  s t ruc tu res  cannot be e a s i l y  t ransp lan ted from 
one c u l t u r e  t o  another.  Nevertheless, through the  normal f l u x  o f  p o l i c y ,  
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  development s low ly  occurs anyway, i n  more o r  l e s s  ad hoc 
fashion.  Comparative i n s i g h t  can he lp  t o  d i r e c t  r e f l e c t i o n  and adaptat ion 
i n  more d e l i  berate and cons t ruc t i ve  ways. 
I n  add i t i on ,  t h i s  work i s  o f  importance f o r  cu r ren t  attempts t o  develop 
e f f e c t i v e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  regimes o f  hazardous waste management, v i a  harmoniza- 
t i o n  o f  na t i ona l  approaches. The I I A S A  work demonstrates the  1  i m i t a t i o n s  
of approaches dependent upon techn ica l  harmonizat ion a1 one. The present 
paper shows how pervasive and complex are  the  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  fo rces  which 
shape techn ica l  p o l i c y  inst ruments i n  d i f f e r e n t  p r a c t i c a l  ways, even w i t h i n  
na t iona l  sys tems . 
The I I A S A  p r o j e c t  was w r i t t e n  up as a  ser ies  of Working Papers pub1 ished 
i n  May 1984. I n  rev i sed  form it w i l l  be publ ished as a  book i n  1986 and w i l l  
i nc lude  a  chapter on the  Netherlands drawn p a r t l y  f rom the  present paper. 
Ted Munn 
Head o f  Environment Program 

ABSTRACT 
This paper is  about risk management  and environmental policy. Conventional 
approaches t o  risk management (Wynne et al., I IASA Working Papers on 
Hazardous Waste Management) tend t o  assume t h a t  risk i s  a technical  
phenomenon, and t h a t  successful risk management involves t h e  elaboration 
and use of precise technical  analyt ic  models and regulatory instruments. 
The a im of this work is  t o  show tha t  this general approach i s  unrealistic. 
Firstly, i t  i s  shown t h a t  d i f ferent  perceptions and definitions of policy 
issues shape legislative and regulatory agendas in ways which mean t ha t  
environmental management and specific definitions of risk problems a r e  only 
a (varying) par t  of t h e  broader agendas and concerns of in teract ing groups. 
Secondly, i t  i s  shown t h a t  even a f t e r  apparently precise regulations have 
been established, t h e  process of implementation effect ively  continues t h e  
negotiation of t h e  basic agenda of issues as defined by d i f fe ren t  interests.  
This is  shown t o  be t h e  case at national and local levels. The family of 
Dutch case studies presented supports t h e  argument of t h e  I IASA hazardous 
was te  papers, t ha t  e f fec t ive  regulatory instruments c an  only be identified in 
t h e  context  of in teract ion between t h e  institutional reali t ies of regulatory 
decision making and appropria te  forms of technical knowledge. These vary 
f rom one  regulatory system t o  another,  making technical  harmonisation 
extremely problematic. 
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I. Introduction 
Institutional reali t ies,  including pas t  exper ience ,  shape policy agendas,  
problem definitions, t h e  se t t ing and use of technical  norms and t h e  way 
uncer ta in t ies  a r e  managed in t h e  field of risk management  and hazardous 
wastes. Dirven has  given a n  account  of t h e  inst i tut ional  processes which 
a f fec ted  t h e  formulation and implementation of regulations in t h e  Dutch 
Chemical  Waste Act,  t h e  main regulatory f ramework  f o r  cu r ren t  w a s t e  
management ,  and t h e  Soil Clean Up  (interim) Act,  t h e  regula tory  
f ramework f o r  dealing wi th  wastes  f rom t h e  past. His accoun t  focussed 
mainly upon t h e  cen t ra l  government level. To comple te  his  analyt ica l  
picture,  however, requires  a t t en t ion  to local processes, especial ly at t h e  
level  of t h e  municipality. 
Municipalities, as well as provinces, a r e  ter r i tor ia l ly  dispersed 2 
author i t ies  having thei r  own political identi ty;  they  a r e  accountable  to the i r  
own houses of representa t ives ,  t h e  municipal and provincial councils  
respectively. In t h e  s i tuat ions  w e  consider in th is  paper w e  a lso  encounter  
so cal led  functionally decentra l ized authori t ies,  of which t h e  w a t e r  
author i t ies  (waterschappen e n  (hoog-)heemraadschappen) a r e  impor tan t  
3 
examples  . 
The execut ion of qu i t e  a number of environmental  acts has been delegated 
to lower authori t ies,  especial ly provinces. Measures connected wi th  t h e  
Nuisance Act,  a n  act dat ing f rom 1875 and  intended to reduce  nuisance 
caused by industrial ac t iv i ty ,  a r e  taken by t h e  municipalities. But if a n  
industrial fac i l i ty  crosses  municipal boundaries, o r  if o t h e r  environmental  
legislation i s  involved, provincial states coordinate  l icencing procedures. The  
Soil C lean  Up  (interim) Act has g ran ted  execu t ive  author i ty  to  t h e  
provincial level; however, in th i s  case t h e  f inancial  author i ty  i s  in t h e  
hands of t h e  c e n t r a l  government. Such a par t ia l  division o f -  author i ty  
strongly influences t h e  implementa t ion of regulations. 
J.M.C.Dirven, f i r s t  pa r t  of t h e  Netherlands case study. 
We use th i s  t e r m  to deno te  decentra l i sa t ion without c o m p l e t e  delegat ion 
of f inancial  authori ty.  
In s o m e  cases provinces and w a t e r  author i ty  coincide  (e.g. in t h e  province 
of ~ t r e c h t ) .  A wa te r schap  i s  in c h a r g e  of t h e  maintenance of dikes, 
roads, bridges and t h e  navigability of canals. 
03 
According t o  t he  conventional view of implementation, cen t ra l  regulations 
enforced at local levels with varying degrees of competence, vigour, 
resources, information, etc., and thus varying levels of ac tua l  enforcement. 
Implementation can  be improved by improving these factors.  More recently, 
however, authors (such a s  Diver (1)) have shown tha t  divergent institutional 
reali t ies and rationalities prevail at the  central  and local levels. The 
respective par ts  of t he  overall regulatory systems a r e  responding t o  
different signals, constraints and imposed objectives within their  institutional 
environments. Optimising their  regulatory function means very different and 
not necessarily mutually consistent things at t h e  different  institutional 
levels. 
Understanding implementation at t he  local level is  therefore  crucial fo r  
understanding risk management and regulation. Those affected by the  
enforcement of an  act view the  act from widely differing perspectives. For 
them i t  i s  a new fac tor  of variable negotiability in dealing with problems 
already on  their agendas. They have t o  f i t  t he  new features  brought about 
by the  legislation into t he  way they routinely deal with problems. It i s  a 
new resource or  constraint introduced into t he  situation. Decision analysts 
and other  students of policy processes tend t o  view policy problem 
definitions as given ent i t ies  even in the  environmental field. But as will 
become apparent from this paper, all  problem definitions a r e  socially 
shaped, therefore  in flux and contingent. Central  policy activities a r e  
only one of t he  fac tors  influencing local problem definitions and agendas. 
A new act i s  in this  sense no starting point: i t  comes in to  being in an  
already existing s t ruc ture  of legal, social and institutional behaviour. 
Problems tha t  a r e  being deal t  with can change by i t ,  but  will usually not 
disappear by the  new regulation. Yet, new legislation does add t o  
. 
institutional uncertainty; additional experience may be needed t o  handle the  
features  brought about by t h e  new rules. 
It i s  not only t he  'implementation phase1 of a new act t ha t  is viewed 
differently at different levels in society. In addition, t h e  way the  problem 
is defined at the  cen t ra l  level may not resemble t he  problem as seen by 
residents o r  local authorties. As Dirven has described from a central  
viewpoint t he  chemical waste issue has been viewed primarily as a problem 
industrial s t ruc ture  and management ,  whereas in t h e  soil clean-up deba te  a 
risk management  viewpoint was forced upon cen t ra l  government.  But 
from t h e  local viewpoint t h e  risk management perspective was dominant in 
t h e  issue of chemical  w as t e  as well as soil clean-up. This was largely 
due t o  t h e  close in teract ion of local authorit ies with concerned residents. 
By describing several  cases in th i s  paper w e  show t h e  ways in which local 
municipalities in te rac t  with cen t ra l  and provincial governments,  and local 
groups, in t h e  implementat ion of hazardous was te  management.  
With respect  t o  t h e  Chemical  Waste Act, t h e  main Dutch concerns  at t h e  
cen t ra l  governmental  level r e l a t e  t o  t h e  problem of establishing a hazardous 
waste  Treatment  and Disposal (T & D) infrastructure.  Therefore,  t h e  risk 
assessment dimensions of th i s  issue have been ra ther  ab s t r ac t  and technical  
(e.g. t o  do  with t h e  overall  w as t e  classification system,  see Dirven). At t h e  
local level, however, t h e  risk dimensions of t h e  hazardous was t e  problem 
prevail, a s  can  be  seen  by t h e  local disturbance caused by industrial plans 
t o  establish a national w as t e  disposal si te;  and by t h e  ac t iv i t i es  of some 
national companies. 
The scarci ty  of hazardous w as t e  T & D facil i t ies have c r ea t ed  regulatory 
problems at t h e  local level as i s  shown by t h e  EMKIUniser and Booy Clean 
cases. In these  cases local  authorit ies,  confronted with t h e  environmental  
and heal th  risks caused by w as t e  t rea tment  f irms, worked in conf l ic t  with 
regional and cen t r a l  government by trying t o  impose res t r ic t ions  on 
those firms. 
In a number of soil pollution cases, however, t h e  s i tuat ion i s  qui te  
different.  The dif ferences  a r e  in t h r ee  areas: 
I. In t h e  case of hazardous was te  T & D, t h e  w a s t e  management 
approach of c en t r a l  government was obstructed by a risk management 
. 
approach of local  government,  but in t h e  issue of soil pollution a 
risk management approach seems  t o  be  t he  overriding viewpoint o n  all 
levels. 
2. With respect  t o  hazardous waste,  local c i t izens  showed no  divergence 
from t h e  local government viewpoint, whereas in soil  pollution cases 
t h e r e  was much m o r e  antagonism between local government and 
residents. 
3. Concerning hazardous waste Treatment  and Disposal, t h e  most 
important  f a c t o r  t h e  government has t o  deal with is industry, whereas 
in t h e  soil pollution issue industry successfully managed t o  avoid t h e  
financial burden. 
These differences c an  be explained by t h e  history of t h e  soil pollution issue 
in the  Netherlands and t h e  characterist ics of soil pollution as a problem. 
The issue of soil pollution arose almost overnight, and unexpected, when the  
pollution at Lekkerkerk was acknowledged by minister Ginjaar. The Chemical 
Waste Act and i t s  consequences formed par t  of a n  ongoing r q l a t o r y  
debate.  Before Lekkerkerk became a n  issue in 1980, some cases  of soil 
pollution were  known, but ap a r t  from t h e  local residents and local and 
provincial author i t ies  directly involved a t tent ion t o  these  cases was scant. 
In Lekkerkerk a housing development was built on  a landfill of chemical 
waste  and household refuse. In 1980, t he  possibility t h a t  the  inhabitants of 
t h e  houses were  exposed t o  t h e  chemical waste  was recognized. Government 
decided t o  remove t h e  polluted soil. The c lean up operation was performed 
within half a year  at tremendous cos t  (almost 200 million Dutch guilders, 
o r  80 million US dollars). The Lekkerkerk incident remained in the  public 
a t t en t ion  fo r  over  a year  and thus t h e  soil pollution issue was associated 
strongly with public health. In this respect i t  is comparable t o  t he  Vac 
incident in Hungary (see E. Kiss, IIASA Hungary case  study). The publicity 
around Lekkerkerk a le r ted  t h e  public t o  t h e  general  issue of soil pollution, 
a t t r a c t i n g  public a t t en t ion  t o  other  cases. I t  st imulated t he  Ministry t o  
organize a national inventory of suspected soil pollution cases. From this 
inventory i t  was concluded t h a t  i t  would be financially impossible t o  deal 
with o ther  cases as thorougly as Lekkerkerk. 
An extensive procedurc was laid down in t h e  d ra f t  of t he  Soil Clean-Up 
(interim) Act t o  ratiohalize t h e  approach of soil pollution cases and t o  
adapt  i t  t o  f inancial  resources. Other  soil pollution cases already in 
progress were  forced into  this procedure even before t he  Act  was enacted.  
In th i s  way government hoped t o  escape t h e  financial burden which would 
be imposed by dealing -with o ther  cases as Lekkerkerk had been handled. I t  
was f e l t  tha t  in Lekkerkerk too  much money had been spent with too l i t t l e  
knowledge of t h e  pollu .an risks. 
I t  was t h e  shock of Lekkerkerk t h a t  prompted a different  history f o r  t h e  
creat ion and implementat ion of the  Soil Clean-Up (interim) Act in relation 
t o  t h e  Chemical Waste Act. The sudden emergence of a direct  th rea t  t o  
public heal th  occasioned a risk management approach. After this approach 
had been established in t h e  case of Lekkerkerk, i t  remained 
t h e  s t a r t ing  point fo r  ac t ion in soil pollution si tuations,  even  if less 
rigorous. s tandards  of risk reduction were  applied. 
2. CHEMICAL WASTE 
In t h e  case of soil pollution a clearcut  local incident,  Lekkerkerk, c a n  be 
seen as t h e  s t a r t i n g  point for  general anxiety, followed by legislation and 
t h e  soil c l ean  up  operation.  
No such single incident c a n  be t r aced  as a s t a r t i n g  point f o r  chemical  
was te  legislation. This legislation resulted f rom t h e  slowly growing anxiety 
about damage caused by hazardous waste  t o  t h e  public and  t h e  environment 
1 if uncontrolled, result ing in t h e  provisional Chemical  Waste Act  in 1973 . 
On t h e  cen t ra l  level t h e  hazardous was te  problem was  seen as a problem 
of establishing a new industrial organizational infras t ructure .  The main 
f e a t u r e  of t h e  Chemical  Waste Act was t o  provide f o r  a n  organizational 
framework within which chemical  waste  would be  removed effectively.  The 
Act did not  give a n y  directives of how chemical  w a s t e  should be t r ea ted ,  
but f o r  prohibition of disposal on land (see ~ i r v e n ) .  The establishment 
of t h e  necessary t r e a t m e n t  and disposal facil i t ies was  l e f t  t o  industry. 
Industrial Planning fo r  Hazardous Waste Treatment  and Disposal 
The industry was  thus  confronted with t h e  hazardous was te  problem more  
clearly t h a n  before. The amount of wastes  needing handling grew 
d u e  t o  t h e  growth of (chemical) industries and t o  t h e  tightening u p  of 
discharge regulations (for example, t h e  required w a t e r  purification systems 
produce w a s t e  sludges with large  amounts of tox ic  substances). 
Also a number of fo rmer  conventional routes  of disposing of industrial 
was te  became less viable (ocean dumping) o r  w e r e  forbidden (dumping on 
land), thus  forcing industry t o  act. They did so, f o r  instance,  by trying t o  
. . 
influence t h e  f inal  fo rm of t h e  Chemical  Waste Act ,  e.g. by negotiat ing t h e  
s tandards  f o r  defining which waste  is  considered t o  be chemical  o r  not. In 
th i s  respect  t h e y  found t h e  Ministry of Economic Affairs t o  be a n  
ally. 
The Chemical  Waste Bill was sen t  t o  parl iament in 1973 but was  not  
enac ted  until 1979. 
But they a lso t r i ed  t o  ant ic ipate  t h e  si tuation t h a t  would result  as soon 
as t h e  act was enforced. From industry's perspective t h e r e  was one  
essential  corners tone missing if they we re  t o  comply with t h e  act, 
namely a n  opportunity t o  dump chemicals on  a controlled si te.  
A number of l a rge  chemical f i rms like Akzo, Unilever and Dow Chemical 
founded Induval. Induval began in 1973, without any publicity, t o  develop 
a plan for  a controlled chemical dumping site. The dump was intended t o  
deal with those  chemicals fo r  which t he r e  were  no  e f fec t ive  and 
environmentally accep tab le  methods of processing. 
The plan contained a technical  elaboration of t h e  dumping ground which 
was supplemented in 1976 with "a confidential investigation" of four 
possible dumping s i t es  in t h e  province of North Brabant. Contac t  was 
made with t h e  Ministries of Economic Affairs and Public Health and 
Environment which gave t h e  go ahead fo r  t h e  plan t o  be submit ted t o  
t h e  County Aldermen (2). 
The plan, however, had been leaked t o  t h e  environmental  Foundation, 
Nature and Environment, which strongly opposed t h e  idea of a dumping 
ground. From the i r  perspective such a dumping ground could lead t o  
serious pollution of t h e  soil and t h e  groundwater and t h e  primary 
industrial a im should be t o  prevent t he  production of chemical  waste  (3). 
Nature and Environment thought t ha t  industry was generally unwilling t o  
look fo r  I1clean t e c h n ~ l o g i e s ~ ~  and good processing methods. 
The leak c r ea t ed  substantial  opposition in North Brabant; t h e  four 
favoured c i t ies  re jected plans fo r  such a dump in their  terr i tory.  In a 
discussion with t h e  County Aldermen, of North Brabant t h e  ministers of 
Economic Affairs and Health and Environmental Protection said t h a t  t he  
Induval plan was consistent with t h e  national Chemical Waste Act. 
Industry was t o  develop init iat ives t o  s t o r e  o r  process chemical  was te  
The ministers announced, however, t h a t  they would review t h e  plans of 
Induval. In 1977, a meet ing took place between t he  ministers and Induval 
where  a l ist  of chemicals was drawn up t ha t  could be considered fo r  
storing and some technical  changes in t he  blueprints of t h e  dumps were  
made (4,5). In August 1977 Induval presented t h e  second version of t h e  
plan in which t h e  e x a c t  spot  of t h e  possible dumping ground was kept 
open (6) .  Cent ra l  government supported t h e  plan because t h e y  thought i t  
imperat ive  for  t h e  functioning of t h e  Chemical Waste Act (5). The plan was 
presented t o  t h e  provinces of Overijssel, Gelderland, North Brabant and 
Limburg, all of which unanimously re jected (7). The reasons given were  
insufficient guaran tee  agains t  leakage, insufficient description of wastes, and 
insufficient investigation of o the r  processing a l ternat ives  (8). Because of t h e  
adamant  rejection by t h e  provinces, t h e  Induval plan was abandoned. 
The rise and fa l l  of t h e  Induval plan clarif ied t h e  views t aken  by t h e  
di f ferent  groups with respect  t o  hazardous was te  t r e a t m e n t  and disposal 
facilities. Industry was  str iving for  t h e  undisturbed conduct of business in a 
cost ef fec t ive  way and  independent from landfil l  fac i l i t ies  in foreign 
countries. Cen t ra l  government supported t h e  Induval init iat ive because i t  
f i t t e d  with a cooperat ive  approach t o  t h e  hazardous w a s t e  problem (" the  
i n d u s t r i a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e - a p p r o a c h " ) .  Local and 
regional authorit ies,  as well as environmental  groups, w e r e  primarily 
concerned about t h e  environmental  risks and thus  adopted a risk-management 
framework. They put emphasis  on  reprocessing of wastes  and viewed landfill 
as t h e  las t  resor t  solution. 
As discussed above,  discussion on t h e  establishment of hazardous was te  
t r e a t m e n t  and disposal facil i t ies began in t h e  ea r ly  70's. Negotiations at a 
cen t ra l  level  have continued in t h e  80's  and t h e r e  a r e  as y e t  no  facil i t ies 
in operation. 
Yet ,  approximately 1 million tons of chemical  wastes  generated e a c h  year  
had t o  be handled in s o m e  way (10). In part ,  i t  was  t r e a t e d  by t h e  was te  
1 producing f i rms  themselves,  o r  stored on  thei r  premises ; in pa r t ,  i t  was 
expor ted t o  foreign countries,  dumped legally o r  illegally, o r  handled by 
f i rms  specialized in t r e a t i n g  wastes. 
We have t o  bear  in mind t h a t  s torage of wastes  on  t h e  premises of t h e  
f i rm t h a t  produced i t  i s  not  regulated by t h e  Chemical  Waste Act. Such 
storage is only subordinate to  regulations within the Nuisance kt. 
It was this las t  category of f i rms tha t  fulfilled an important role in t h e  
o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  a p p r o a c h  t o  t he  hazardous waste  
problem. Central  government viewed these firms as the  beginning of a 
crucial network t reat ing all  kinds of wastes and, therefore, was willing t o  
offer  support. But, some of these waste t rea tment  firms caused severe 
nuisance at t h e  local level. Problems arose because local authorities pursued 
a risk management policy t ha t  was at odds with t h e  policy of regional and 
national authorit ies which support waste t rea tment  firms. 
The EMK case 
This case study focusses on  the  history of t he  waste  t reatment  firm EMK 
in Krimpen aan d e  IJssel from 1970 t o  1980. In t he  la te  70's EMK became 
a daughter company of Uniser, t h e  biggest waste t reatment  firm in t h e  
Netherlands. 
In 1981, a major scandal arose in t he  Netherlands concerning t h e  way in 
which chemical wastes were processed by Uniser. Many laws had been 
infringed. Uniser had drained and dumped wastes illegally throughout t h e  
Netherlands. There was also a large-scale selling of hazardous wastes as oil 
and, a f t e r  mixing with coal, a s  solid fuel. This scandal led up t o  
prosecution of t he  t o p  management of Uniser, t he  biggest environmental 
court  case in Dutch history. 
At t he  request of members of parliament a commit tee  was set up by t h e  
Under Secretary of Health and Environmental Protection t o  undertake a n  
inquiry into t h e  conduct of Uniser and EMK. The report  of this Commit tee  
Hellinga was t h e  main source of material  for t h e  historical details below 
(I I). 
In 1970, t h e  Exploitatie Maatschappij Krimpen Ltd. (EMK) was 
founded. It was located on t h e  former s i t e  of the  Chemical 
Industry Uithoorn Ltd., (CINDU) in Krimpen aan  de  IJssel. 
The ClNDU had been processing t a r  and t a r  products under a 
1965 Nuisance Act licence. EMK presented itself as  a 
merchandizing company of oils and fats.  In EMK vocabulary, 
however, t h e  word merchandizing included regenerating, 
reconditioning and processing of t h e  f a t s  and oils as well. 
Since EMK took over the  s i t e  and premises t he  ClNDU 
Nuisance Act licence was passed on  t o  EMK. This licence 
formally covered the  EMK activit ies (provided EMK stuck t o  
the te rms  of t h e  licence). 
From t h e  beginning there  were complaints about severe stench 
from EMk and following a DCMR ( t h e  R i j n m o n d  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c o n t r o l  b o d y )  report  on t h e  bad situation on 
the  premises of EMK, the  Court of Mayor and Aldermen of 
Krimpen took action in August 1970. They requested tha t  EMK 
apply for  a new Nuisance Act l icence for  their  en t i re  
organisation since, according t o  t he  DCMR, the  old CINDU 
licence did not cover all  t he  activit ies of EMK. Repeatedly 
EMK did not f i le  a complete application. Following a number of 
deadlines from the  municipality, a s  well a s  t h e  th rea t  of 
closing down EMK, a complete application was submitted in 
August 1971. During this year there  were continuing complaints 
about stench nuisance. The old CINDU licence did not cover 
t he  processing of stench raising compounds; yet,  there  were 
several deliveries of t he  stench-raising compound Resinformer a t  
the  EMK site.  In November, 1970, a ship carrying approximately 
530 tons of Resinformer sank a t  t he  EMK embankment. The 
municipality repeatedly threatened t o  close down (part of)  t he  
EMK organisation if i t  did not stop t h e  processing of 
stench-raising compounds. However, in September 1971, barrels 
with such compounds were still being stored on t h e  EMK site. 
From the  summer of 1971 onwards several individuals and 
institutions reported t o  t h e  Krimpen authorit ies t h e  deplorable 
situation a t  EMK. In a confidential report  of DCMR i t  was 
s ta ted  t ha t  "A v a s t  p a r t  of t h e  s i t e  i s  c o v e r e d  w i t h  a 
t a r - l i k e  s u b s t a n c e .  A n e a r b y  d i t c h  i s  n e a r l y  f i l l e d  
w i t h  t h e  s a m e  k i n d  of  s u b s t a n c e .  S i n c e  a p i p e  f r o m  
o n e  of t h e  t a n k s  e m p t i e s  i n t o  t h e  d i t c h  o n e  g e t s  
t h e  i m p r e s s i o n  t h a t  t h e  s t a t e  of t h e  d i t c h  i s  n o t  
b e i n g  i m p r o v e d  ..... O n e  c a n  s t a t e  t h a t  p r a c t i c a l l y  
e v e r y  r e g u l a t i o n  i s  b e i n g  v i o l a t e d " .  (12) 
In spi te  of this devastating report  of DCMR t h e  Court of 
Mayor and Aldermen did not take any real act ion except t o  
increase inspection of t he  EMK in close co-operation with the 
Korps Controleurs Gevaarlijke Stoffen and t h e  Centrale  Meld e n  
Regelkamer Rijnmond ( the Control body for  hazardous 
substances, and t h e  Cent ra l  report  and adjustment (regulation) 
off ice Rijnmond, respectively). 
In November 1971, EMK was installed a number of storagetanks, 
in spi te  of s ta tements  by the  municipality t h a t  they were not 
t o  put tanks into use without t he  necessary building and 
Nuisance Act licences. In reaction the  Krimpen municipality, 
with t he  help of t he  police, stopped this  activity 
of EMK and prohibited t h e  use of t h e  tanks. In response a n  
EMK director  announced t h a t  h e  would ask o ther  government 
agencies t o  intervene.  Employees f rom t h e  Regional 
Environmental Inspectorate and t h e  Rijnmond author i ty  asked t h e  
municipality of Krimpen asking whether  such e x t r e m e  measures  
were  necessary, emphasizing t h e  importance of industrial 
removal, discharge and processing of chemical  was te  and was te  
oils. 
At th is  t i m e  (1971), t h e  municipality had been wait ing several  
months fo r  t h e  Ministry of Health and Environmental Protect ion 
t o  respond t o  another  problem apparently c r e a t e d  by Ministry: 
al location of par t  of EMK's s i t e  fo r  s to rage  of barrels of 
hazardous was te  fo r  ocean  dumping. 
The f a c t  t h a t  a n  answer from t h e  Ministry failed t o  come,  
combined with pressure f rom t h e  Inspectorate over  s toppage of 
EMK's t ank  instal lat ion made t h e  Krimpen municipality feel  
abandoned by higher authorities. They expressed th i s  feeling 
during exchanges with t h e  Inspectorate,  which agreed t o  keep in 
touch on  t h e  EMK case. 
I t  s t i l  took some t i m e  before  t h e  Ministry responded, and  t h e n  
very generally. Apar t  f rom t h e  s t a t e m e n t  t h a t  they  did not  
approve a s to rage  s i t e ,  they  responded t h a t  i t  was advisable t o  
supervise private en te rpr i se  in t h e  field of waste; t h e  Regional 
Inspectorate should advise them in t h e s e  mat ters .  
The conflict  between cen t ra l  and regional government and t h e  
Krimpen local author i ty  re f l ec ted  t h e  government 's  overriding 
concern t o  maintain a n  industrial infras t ructure  fo r  hazardous 
was te  t r ea tment .  This i s  a l so  ref lected in t h e  emphasis of t h e  
Chemical  Waste Act  on  encouraging and c rea t ing  such a n  
infrastructure.  The a l ready f ragi le  a t t r ac t ion  f o r  p r iva te  
investments in to  w a s t e  management would be fu r the r  jeopardized 
by increased regulatory constraints,  on  th i s  new industrial 
sector.  
The Regional Inspectorate  was concerned with t h e  dumping of 
container rubbish, frequently containing industrial and chemical  
waste,  in t h e  surroundings of Krimpen, and  t h e  operat ion of 
EMK prevented,  at l eas t  in par t ,  t h e  illegal dumping of 
chemical  waste.  This may explain t h e  dismissive a t t i t u d e  of t h e  
Inspectorate. 
Temporary closure of EMK 
After  t h e  above mentioned incident, t h e  act iv i t ies  of t h e  
municipality were  intensified. Although t h e r e  was  a daily 
inspection of t h e  EMK s i t e  by a n  employee,  i t  was no t  very 
e f fec t ive  since, as became evident l a te r ,  t h e  Nuisance Act 
l icence conditions w e r e  unknown t o  th i s  controlling employee. 
Ye t  substances s to red  on  t h e  EMK s i t e  were  regularly sampled 
and analyzed, which resulted once  in t h e  spot t ing of a n  
infringment of t h e  Nuisance Act. 
In t he  continuing procedure for  a new Nuisance Act licence, 
t he  municipality adviser concluded tha t  t h e  EMK application 
sti l l  did not meet  the  requirements. The municipality decided 
not t o  grant EMK a new licence and t o  wait fo r  an  
opportunity t o  shut down EMK. That opportunity arose when 
analyses showed tha t  EMK stored substances not covered by 
their  Nuisance Act licence. Consequently, in 1972 t h e  
municipality ordered the  immediate closing down of EMK, siting 
risks t o  l ife for  t he  neighbourhood. 
The EMK lodged an appeal with the  Crown and instituted a law 
suit  against the  municipality. This led t o  a se t t l ement  by 
agreement ,  suggested by the  judge. The compromise agreement  
between EMK and the  municipality held t h a t  t h e  old Nuisance 
Act licence from 1965 would remain valid with t he  addition of 
a number of new conditions limiting t h e  kind of substances 
allowed t o  be stored and processed. It was also agreed tha t  
EMK would submit a new application for  a licence. 
In t he  following years the  most important incident was the  
so-called Papendrecht affair  in t he  beginning of 1977. It 
appeared tha t  EMK had buried a number of barrels containing 
arsenic substances on a dumping s i t e  in Papendrecht. The EMK 
director was prosecuted, and fined and sentenced t o  a suspended 
imprisonment. The director subsequently resigned from the  
Dutch Advisory Commit tee  on used oil, a s ta tu tory  advisory 
off ice  of t he  Minister of Health and Environmental Protection. 
After long delays a new Nuisance Act l icence t o  EMK was 
finally granted in August 1977. The Rijnmond authorities 
assumed responsibility for  the  Nuisance Act t o  assure bet ter  
coordination of environmental protection on  t h e  regional level. 
EMK again appealed the conditions of t h e  licence. 
In 1977, EMK announced a t ransfer  of i t s  activit ies t o  
Moerdijk. At t he  same t ime the  Rijnmond authori ty  agreed t o  a 
step-by-step renovation of EMK. EMK then repeatedly prolonged 
deadlines t o  t he  point when they announced in 1980 the  closure 
of a l l  activit ies in Krimpen. It had k c o m e  evident t h a t  for  
them doing business within t he  f r ame  of t he  Nuisance Act was 
impossible. 
Meantime complaints continued about s tench nuisance. Numerous 
infringements of t h e  Nuisance Act were  observed, and  recorded 
in a so-called I f b l a c k  f i l e l '  (complaint book) by t h e  
environmental  protection agency of Ri jnmond (I 3). 
When dismantling on  t h e  EMK s i t e  began, a t r u e  ca tas t rophe  
became apparent.  The ground turned out  t o  be very heavily 
polluted with oil and a romat ic  and phenolic compounds. Also 
enormous amounts of chemical  waste  were  found on  t h e  s i t e  in 
tanks  and storagecellars as well as in a moored boat (14). Thus, 
t h e  f i r s t  Dutch T & D facil i ty turned into o n e  of t h e  worst  
soil pollution cases in Dutch history. 
Continuing EMK within t h e  Uniser company 
After  abandoning i t s  s i t e  in Krimpen, t h e  illegal ac t iv i t i e s  of 
EMK continued on  t h e  industrial s i t e  of Moerdijk. In 1976, EMK 
had established t h e  RTM ( ~ e c y c l e  Terminal ~ o e r d i j k )  in a joint 
venture  with Drisolco, a f i rm handling chemical  wastes. 
These t h r e e  firms,  EMK, RTM, and Drisolco, w e r e  placed under 
t h e  holding company, Uniser Holding Ltd., at t h e  end  of 1977. 
This combination c r e a t e d  t h e  image of t h e  was te  processing 
company in t h e  Netherlands, which c o u l d o f f e r  a n  in tegral  
service  (16). The w a s t e  flow from numerous (chemical)  
companies t o  Uniser grew, and in 1979 i t  received and  
processed some 100.000 tons  of waste. 
In commercia l  publications (15) Uniser advertised a division of 
labour between i t s  companies: EMK was responsible f o r  
t ranspor t ,  Drisolco for  s torage,  and RTM for  processing w a s t e  
oils and chemical  wastes. But t h e  actual  s i tuat ion di f fered s o  
great ly  t h a t  t h e  public prosecutor in t h e  cour tcase  agains t  t h e  
Uniser referred t o  i t  as "a g r e a t  f a k e  s h o w u  (17). Uniser 
was t h e  cloak masking such illegal ac t iv i t ies  as discharging, 
dumping and selling of wastes. 
In 1980, a suspicious leak from a s torage t anker  hired by 
Drisolco was investigated,  which led eventually t o  t h e  a r r e s t  of 
t h e  Uniser management  in August 198 1. The ensuing cour tcase  
resulted in -  t h e  imprisonment of t h e  suspects for  periods of 7 
months t o  2 /  years. 
Enforcement of environmental  legislation with respect  t o  EMK 
In Krimpen full a t t e n t i o n  was given by the municipality t o  the e n f o r c a n t  
t h e  Nuisance Act. Other  regulations, such as t h e  Act on  t h e  Pollution 
Surfacewater  and t h e  Provincial Regulation on  Chemical  Waste, did no t  play 
a part. 
The a im of t h e  Nuisance Act i s  t o  prevent " d a n g e r ,  d a m a g e  o r  
n u i s a n c e  b y  i n s t a l l a t i o n s t t  t o  thei r  surroundings. This Act,  dat ing f rom 
1875, i s  considered t o  be t h e  oldest environmental  law in t h e  Netherlands, 
although i t  was  no t  primarily intended t o  be a n  environmental  act. The 
Nuisance Act  states t h a t  installations mentioned in t h e  Nuisance Order  
( ~ i n d e r w e t  besluit) may  no t  be operated o r  be extended o r  modified 
without a licence. This i s  normally granted o n  request  by t h e  municipality 
in which a f i rm i s  established. In most cases t h e  l icence contains conditions 
prescribing in de ta i l  t h e  kind of ac t iv i t ies  permit ted  within t h e  f i rm and 
t h e  measures t o  be t aken  by t h e  l icencee t o  diminish danger,  damage o r  
nuisance t o  t h e  surroundings. 
Until 1979 t h e  Nuisance Act contained only one  adminis t ra t ive  sanction: 
closure of t h e  f i rm,  preceded by a warning of proposed closure. The l a t t e r  
i s  no t  necessary in case of danger t o  l i fe  o r  unbearable nuisance t o  
surroundings. Closure of t h e  f i rm is prescribed imperatively if a f i r m  i s  in 
operation without o r  in violation of a licence. 
At f i r s t  sight t h e  Nuisance Act i s  a well prepared law providing fo r  t h e  
necessary protect ion of surroundings agains t  industrial activit ies.  Despite th i s  
act, however, s e v e r e  nuisance and pollution could n o t  be ef fec t ive ly  
prevented in Krimpen. The reason appeared t o  be t h e  weak a t t i t u d e  of t h e  
local author i t ies ,  y e t  in real i ty  t h e y  w e r e  no t  supported by higher level 
authorit ies in enforcing t h e  Nuisance Act. On t h e  contrary ,  when t h e  
municipality was  resolute ,  it was repremanded by higher au thor i t ies  
Indeed leniency in enforcing t h e  Nuisance Act was  sanctioned in off ic ia l  
guidelines f rom t h e  Ministry. In a circular  ' f rom t h e  Ministry of Social 
Affairs in 1960 i t  is s ta ted:  "... i t  i s  n o t  i n t e n d e d  t h a t  t h e  
m e a s u r e  o f  c l o s u r e  b e  u s e d  i m m e d i a t e l y  a g a i n s t  f i r m s  w h i c h  
a r e  f o u n d  o p e r a t i n g  w i t h o u t  a l i c e n c e  o r  i n  v i o l a t i o n  w i t h  a 
g r a n t e d  l i c e n c e  (18)" .  
Such guidelines c a n  lead t o  a "symbolic enforcement" of t h e  Nuisance Act,  
and o n e  must keep  th is  in mind when judging t h e  e v e n t s  in Krimpen. The 
Krimpen municipality had given EMK considerable t i m e  (a year)  t o  submit 
a n  application for  a new Nuisance Act licence. In addit ion they  did not  
close EMK down immediate ly  when i t  was found t o  be infringing t h e  law. 
This was  in accordance with official guidelines of t h e  cen t ra l  government.  
The consequence was  t h a t  local authorit ies were  kept on  a s t r ing by a f i rm 
managing t o  obtain respi te  t i m e  and again, which seems  t o  have been t h e  
case in Krimpen. Although, t h e  authorit ies can,  in theory maintain t h e  
initiative, for ins tance,  by sending a warning of proposed c losure  (a 
possibility t h a t  was  not  used by t h e  authorit ies in  rimp pen). When t h e y  did 
close t h e  EMK in May 1972 they  risked being held responsible f o r  t h e  c o s t s  
if i t  could be  shown t h a t  prompt closure was not justified. 
After  t h e  Rijnmond author i t ies  took over t h e  responsibility f rom Krimpen, 
t h e  Nuisance Act was  not enforced more  tightly. In f a c t ,  t h e  pollution did 
not cease until EMK itself  decided t o  t a k e  refuge in Moerdijk. It c a n  be 
concluded t h a t  t h e  Nuisance Act was not  a n  e f fec t ive  tool  in controlling 
t h e  act iv i t ies  of EMK. 
One important  question i s  why t h e  Act on  t h e  Pollution of Surface  w a t e r  
was not  invoked with EMK. The damaging repor t  of t h e  DCMR in 1971 
gave reason enough t o  suspect  EMK of severely polluting t h e  su r facewate r  
(12). The Act,  however,  was  ra the r  new, and t h e  author i t ies  had had l i t t l e  
exper ience in i t s  implementation.  
The EMK submit ted a n  application fo r  a discharging l icence in December  
1974 t h a t  was  no t  granted until March 1979. The procedure was  t i m e  
consuming because  t h e  RIZA ( ~ a t i o n a l  Institute f o r  Purification of Waste  
Water) r eac ted  very slowly in drawing u p  d r a f t  conditions f o r  t h e  EMK 
licence. A year a f t e r  granting, t h e  l icence was  withdrawn because EMK 
closed i t s  operations in Krimpen. 
Thus, t h e  Act on  t h e  Pollution of Surface  w a t e r  did n o t  play a 
par t ,  for  procedural reasons. But as will become c lea r  from t h e  b o y  Clean 
discussed below, enforcement  of environmental  legislation may a l s o  b e  
inhibited when di f ferent  responsible author i t ies  a t t a c h  d i f fe ren t  impor tance  
t o  t h e  availability of technological facilities. 
Booy Clean 
Booy Clean is  located in Rot terdam harbour. The f i rm i s  
c leans  tanks and col lects  ca rgo  remnants  and slobs (remnants 
mixed with washing wate r )  f rom ships and  land installat ions 
(1 9). 
In 1970, local  newspapers began reporting complaints f rom 
neighbours and environmental  in te res t  groups about s t ench  and 
illegal discharges (20). In 1973, a n  environmental  group 
introduced a law sui t  against  Booy Clean,  during which a 
fo rmer  employee of Booy Clean declared t h a t  " p o i s o n ,  o i l  
a n d  c h e m i c a l s  w e r e  r e g u l a r l y  d i s c h a r g e d  i n  t h e  O u d e  
Maas".  The judge acqui t ted  Booy Clean  o n  grounds t h a t  
" t h e r e  w a s  n o  c o n c l u s i v e  e v i d e n c e  t h a t  t h e  
d e c l a r a t i o n s  o f  t h e  w i t n e s s e s  w e r e  b a s e d  o n  f a c t s  
o b s e r v e d  (21). At t h a t  t i m e  Booy Clean did not  have a 
Nuisance Act l icence because i t  was not  subject  t o  
t h e  Nuisance Order,  only t o  t h e  Harbour Regulations (22). In 
t h e  t w o  year  period, 197 1-1973 harbour inspectors had presented 
s o m e  twenty  warrants  agains t  Booy Clean fo r  infringing t h e  
regulations (23). A 1983 repor t  prepared by Rot terdam 
author i t ies  mentioned t h a t  river police alone presented sixty 
warrants,  c i t ing among o ther  things, infringement of t h e  
Chemical  Waste Act and t h e  Act o n  t h e  Pollution of Surface 
wate r  (24). It c a n  be concluded t h a t  t h e  civil se rvan t s  in 
Rot terdam did know of pollution caused by Booy Clean. 
Following e n a c t m e n t  of t h e  Act on  t h e  Pollution of Surface 
water ,  Booy Clean was a " f i c t i v e  l i c e n c e e "  because i t  
discharged before t h e  enforcement .  Booy Clean submit ted a n  
application fo r  a discharging l icence in November 1979, which 
was granted in September 1980 under severa l  conditions. These 
conditions presented restr ict ions on  t h e  substances t o  be 
discharged and  required a reconstruction plan including a n  
appropr ia te  purif ication ins tal lat ion by t h e  beginning of 1984. 
After  t h e  plan was  submit ted in March 1980, deliberations with 
Rijkswaterstaat  ( t h e  Governmental  Water  ~ g e n c y )  began. 
Rijkswaterstaat  was  also responsible for  t h e  discharging l icence 
by Booy Clean. During 1981 l i t t l e  progress was m a d e  in t h e  
deliberations and Booy Clean regularly violated t h e  discharging 
l icence (1 9). 
In August 1981 Ri jkswaters taat  evaluated Booy Clean ' s  
observance of t h e  discharging l icence and concluded t h a t  t h e  
si tuation was deplorable. They coordinated thei r  e f f o r t s  with t h e  
riverpolice, harbour service  and  t h e  DCMR forcing Booy Clean 
t o  observe t h e  discharging l icence and t o  implement  t h e  
reconstruction plan (19). 
In reply t o  a l e t t e r  f rom Ri jkswaters taat ,  Booy Clean denied 
any responsibility f o r  t h e  infr ingements  noted by 
Rijkswaterstaat .  In autumn,  1981, t h e  was te  w a t e r  of Booy 
Clean was regularly inspected and, again,  regulated pollutants 
w e r e  found. At  t h a t  t i m e  i t  was discovered t h a t  t h e  sludge in 
Geul harbour, where  b o y  Clean had been established s ince  
1976, was  severe ly  polluted, including chlorinated hydrocarbons 
fo r  which discharg was  forbidden. 
In l a t e  1981 a judicial inquiry was  in i t ia ted  o n  supposed 
environmental  del ic ts  c o m m i t t e d  by b o y  Clean,  including 
infr ingements  of t h e  Chemical  Waste Act. In March, 1983, t h e  
d i rec tor  and manager  of Booy Clean were  t aken  in to  t empora ry  
custody o n  suspicion of fo rge ry  and  defrauding. 
b o y  Clean ' s  discharging l icence  was  then  withdrawn by t h e  
Ministry (29). Ri jkswaters taa t  took custody of t h e  installations, 
buildings and (private)  cap i t a l  of b o y  Clean to ensure  t h a t  t h e  
f i rm would con t r ibu te  to t h e  costs of cleaning u p  t h e  Geul 
harbour (25). 
In t h e  summer  of 1984 t h e s e  measures  were  reversed by t h e  
S t a t e  Council ( t h e  h i g h e s t  a p p e a l  c o u r t  i n  t h e  
 etherl lands) (30). According to  t h e  S t a t e  Council t h e r e  was  
lack of ev idence  t h a t  Booy Clean had caused t h e  pollution in 
t h e  Geul harbour. Shortly t h e r e a f t e r  b o y  Clean payed half a 
million guilders to escape f u r t h e r  lawsuits and announced t h a t  i t  
would make  a comeback  as a w a s t e  t r e a t m e n t  f i rm in 
combination with o t h e r  f i r m s  (31,321. 
A c lose  look at t h e  b o y  Clean case reveals  again  t h a t  governmental  
agencies  have  divering in te res t s  and o f t en  very di f ferent  policy perspectives 
f rom off ic ia l  versions. 
In a harbour such as Rot te rdam,  which i s  o n e  of t h e  busiest in t h e  world, 
t h e  ex i s t ence  of a t anker  cleaning f i r m  like b o y  Clean i s  imperative.  
According to t h e  Rot te rdam a lde rman ,  van d e r  Dunnen: "Our  h a r b o u r  i s  
f r e q u e n t e d  b y  4 0 . 0 0 0  sea v e s s e l s  e v e r y  y e a r ,  a n d  t h e y  b r i n g  i n  
e v e r y t h i n g  t h a t  C o d  h a s  f o r b i d d e n .  S o  t h e r e  m u s t  b e  a f i r m  t o  
t r e a t  t h e  w a s t e s .  O t h e r w i s e ,  t h e  s h i p s  , w i l l  d r a i n  t h e i r  w a s t e s  
i n  t h e  o p e n  sea" (26). And according t o  Noe of t h e  Rot te rdam harbour 
agency: " I t  i s  n i c e ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  t o  h a v e  a f i r m  a t t i t u d e ,  b u t  as 
l o n g  as t h e r e  a r e  n o  o t h e r  t r e a t m e n t  f a c i l i t i e s  i n  t h e  
N e t h e r l a n d s ,  o n e  s h o u l d  b e  p l i a n t .  We a r e  a w a r e  o f  t h e  f a c t  
t h a t  B o o y  C l e a n  d i s c h a r g e s ,  b u t  t h e r e  a r e  n o t  a l w a y s  
a 1  t e r  n a  t i v e s "  ( 2  1 1. The  prosecution Council was very reserved in taking 
penal  a c t i o n  because accord ing  to t h e  public prosecutor i t  was  possible 
t h a t  t h e  f i r m  c o u l d  b e  r e o r g a n i s e d  i n  s u c h  a w a y  t h a t  i t  
c o u l d  f u l f i l l  a u s e f u l  f u n c t i o n  i n  t h e  R o t t e r d a m  h a r b o u r  (20). I t  
was  diff icult  fo r  a n  environmental  agency,  such as t h e  DCMR, to confront  
t h e  in te res t s  of t h e  powerful  harbour agency,  which had n o t  g ran ted  a 
fixed buoy for  b o y  Clean ' s  f loa t ing  pontoon. This excluded b o y  Clean as 
a f i rm regula ted  under t h e  Nuisance Act, which in t u r n  excluded t h e  
DCMR f rom t h e  pontoon. The  harbour agencies  refused t o  give any  
unsalaried appointments  t o  t h e  civil servants  of t h e  DCMR (271, in o rder  t o  
give them controlling powers. 
In 1983, a n  international convention a imed at preventing pollution by ships, 
t h e  Marpolconvention, required t h a t  sea harbours o f f e r  enough facil i t ies f o r  
delivery and  t r e a t m e n t  of oil- and chemical  remnants. As ea r ly  as 1981, 
Booy Clean and t h r e e  o ther  f i rms had s t a t e d  thei r  des i re  t o  par t ic ipate  in 
th is  so-called harbour rece ip t  facil i ty (19). The cen t ra l  government namely 
t h e  Ministry of Tra f f i c  and Public works was enthusias t ic  s ince  t h e  
suggested plan was  cheaper  than similar plans developed by Rot te rdam and 
Rijnmond (28). Because of th is  support  from t h e  Ministry, Booy Clean 
promised t o  grow into  a n  all-round t r e a t m e n t  f i rm fo r  chemical  wastes,  
despi te  i t s  illegal activit ies.  It was not  until t h e  end  of 1983 t h a t  t h e  
minister  los t  his confidence in b o y  Clean. The f i rm would no t  be 
permit ted  t o  par t ic ipate  in t h e  harbour receipt  facil i t ies,  and  i t s  
discharge l icence would be  withdrawn (29). 
Concluding remarks  
The EMK and  b o y  Clean cases  a r e  good examples of administrat ive 
enforcement  of environmental  legislation with respect  t o  w a s t e  T & D 
f i rms  in t h e  Netherlands. These cases show how enforcement  c a n  be 
paralyzed when t h e  responsible agencies and levels of author i ty  in t h e  
regulatory sys tem have d i f fe ren t  views of t h e  problem. Effect ive  
implementat ion of regulations requires coordination between di f ferent  par ts  
of t h e  adminis t ra t ive  sys tem,  and  th i s  i s  normally a problem. 
If t h e  hazardous was te  issue is  seen as a problem of 
industrial-organizational infras t ructure ,  t r e a t m e n t  f i rms  a r e  seen  as 
a corners tone in a national o r  local  system of w a s t e  t r ea tment .  In a more  
risk-management oriented approach,  such f i rms  a r e  seen a s  risk generat ing 
act iv i t ies  t h a t  must be closely regulated. 
These d i f fe ren t  problem definitions d o  not directly coincide with t h e  
division between cen t ra l  and local  authorit ies.  In t h e  Booy Clean case, fo r  
instance,  t h e  local  harbour author i t ies  supported t h a t  firm. Authorit ies a r e  
frequently blind t o  problems lying outside thei r  policy domain and  the i r  
management  of problems i s  dominated by in teres ts  re la ted t o  t h a t  policy. 
3. SOIL CLEAN U P  
In t h e  introduction, w e  described how government deal t  with t h e  f i r s t  big 
soil pollution c a s e  in t h e  Netherlands at Lekkerkerk. There  t h e  sudden 
emergence  of a di rec t  t h r e a t  t o  public health necess i ta ted a 
risk-management approach. Lekkerkerk c a n  be seen as t h e  rallying point fo r  
f u t u r e  environmental  action.  The developing risk-managment approach,  
however, did not  and cannot  de te rmine  uniquely how a n  issue c a n  
effect ively  be dea l t  with by t h e  di f ferent  institutions involved. Because 
issues a r e  viewed differently at different  institutional levels, regulations 
f rom t h e  national government will not  always be implemented as  intended. 
This was especially t r u e  with respect  t o  t h e  soil pollution issue which 
suddenly and  unexpectedly gained s t a t u s  o n  t h e  politcal agenda,  thereby 
generat ing institutional uncer ta inty  o n  a l l  levels. 
The extensive and deta i led  regulations which were  promulgated by t h e  
Ministry of Public Health and Housing, Physical Planning and Environment 
(VROM) have t o  be seen in t h e  light of t h e s e  uncertainties. The regulations 
go beyond t h e  Soil Clean-Up (interim) Act. In what  follows, we focus  f i r s t  
on  those  regulations which have had a s t rong impact  o n  t h e  handling of 
soil pollution problems at t h e  local  level, and  thus o n  t h e  way c e n t r a l  
government regulations influence act iv i t ies  of local institutions. After  t h a t  
w e  analyze t h r e e  cases in which antagonism a rose  between d i f fe ren t  
insti tutions at t h e  local level. 
The i t e m s  discussed here  a r e  t h e  f inancing of t h e  c lean up  operat ion and  
t h e  selection of pollution cases serious enough t o  be taken up. 
. 
1. Financing c lean up 
The amount  of money spent  o n  soil c l ean  up in t h e  Netherlands i s  largely 
determined by cen t ra l  government,  which contr ibutes  t o  operations t h a t  have 
been approved in a ministerial  procedure described below (2). The 
municipality contributes a threshold amount  of money (depending upon t h e  
number of residents of t h e  municipality) plus 10% of t h e  remaining clean-up 
costs. Central  government provides t he  remaining 90%. This may result in a 
high financial burden for any single municipality. The provinces, on t he  
other  hand, have a major par t  of t h e  preparatory and executive policy, but 
have a negligible contribution in financing soil clean up (see also Dirven) 
(33). 
Industry does not routinely contribute according t o  this  procedure, but 
central  government may if i t  has evidence hold individual industries 
responsible for specific soil pollution cases. However, under Dutch law such 
responsibility i s  difficult  t o  prove and results in long procedures with 
uncertain results (34). 
One consequence of this  threshold procedure is  tha t  larger municipalities 
will pay for  most o r  all of t he  initial (investigation) costs, without any 
guarantee tha t  a clean-up will be implemented. Indeed, provincial and 
central  government decide whether and how clean-up measures a r e  
undertaken. At the  municipal level, t h e  money needed for  clean-up 
activit ies has t o  be reserved at t h e  cos t  of other  activit ies,  since in 
general no additional income is gained. But this is only one  aspect of t he  
financial implications of soil clean up for  Dutch municipalities. If, for 
instance, an  a r ea  i s  designated for  fu ture  housing, soil pollution 
investigations not only cost money, but they also result in serious delays, 
leading t o  costs such as penalties t o  estate development corporations, loss 
of payments by central  government intended t o  support t h e  building 
activities, loss of the  chance t o  build a certain group of houses (which is 
especially important for  quickly growing municipalities). It is, therefore,  not 
surprising tha t  Dutch municipalities view soil pollution as a problem with 
strong and negative financial dimensions, which influence their  management 
approach. The institutional pressures encourage them t o  recognize pollution 
cases ( to  allay local groups) but then  t o  minimize t h e  risks and necessary 
t rea tment  (to minimize costs). t he  sum of these pressures tends  towards 
symbolic policy action only. 
2. Selection of pollution cases 
The selection of pollution cases for  clean-up i s  performed in two  stages. 
The first  is t he  assessment of t he  specific case against a set of criteria,  
which include t h e  (intended) function of t h e  area,  t h e  local pollution 
situation and the  nature  and concentration of pollutants. Corresponding with 
t he  risk-management approach, these  c r i te r ia  were intended t o  assess t h e  
risk of a specific case t o  public health or  t o  t h e  environment. 
Consideration for  clean up is res t r ic ted t o  those cases where direct  contac t  
between man (or t h e  environment) and t h e  pollution i s  considered possible. 
The concept of a ' l o c a l  p o l l u t i o n  s i t u a t i o n '  includes di f ferent  local 
fac to rs  important fo r  t h e  possible spreading of polluting compounds t o  t h e  
surroundings. The concentra t ion of and types of polluting compounds a r e  
measured against  quant i ta t ive  norms: t h e  so-called test f ramework (351, (see 
a lso  Dirven. Of t h e  t h r ee  cr i ter ia ,  t h e  test framework o f f e r s  t h e  most 
c learcut  cri terion t o  decide on  t h e  seriousness of a case and i t ,  therefore ,  
deserves some elaboration. 
According t o  t h e  test f ramework,  t h r ee  values (A, B, and  C )  a r e  assigned 
t o  approximately f i f ty  compounds and compound families. The A-values 
supposedly ref lect  e i the r  t h e  natural  occurrence o r  t h e  de tec t ion  l imit  in 
Dutch soils. B- and C-values appear t o  be derived f rom t h e  A-value by 
simple multiplication. The toxicological and physiochemical pa ramete rs  were  
also considered (361, but how prec i sdy  remains unclear. Therefore,  t h e  
scientif ic basis of t h e  test framework i s  scant ,  but in view of t h e  
f ragmentary knowledge about  consequences of soil pollution t o  man and 
environment i t  i s  doubtful t h a t  any be t te r  based norms could have been 
produced (37). The t e x t  accompanying t h e  test framework i s  very t en ta t ive  
about t h e  reported values (35). 
Despite i t s  shallow scient i f ic  grounding, t h e  t e s t  framework i s  t h e  basis for  
t h e  policy of t h e  di f ferent  governmental  institutions. Those cases where 
pollutants occur above C-level a r e  t o  be considered fo r  c lean up, and c lean 
up  operations should be a imed  at reducing concentrations t o  A-level. The 
norms of fe r  a simple and precise way t o  determine whether a specific case 
should be considered. The test framework appears t o  have been accep ted  
without reservations by res idents  and environmental in te res t  groups in their  
e f fo r t s  t o  persuade government officials t o  t ake  ac t ion  on  a soil  pollution 
problem . 
The t h r ee  cr i ter ia ,  and especially t h e  test framework, have been powerful 
instruments in reducing insti tutional uncertainty in soil pollution cases. 
. 
However, t h e  number of pollution cases requiring clean-up according t o  
these  c r i t e r ia  i s  s o  g rea t  t h a t  t h e  money needed for  clean-up exceeds  t h e  
amount of money made available. Therefore a n  extensive priority se t t ing  
procedure was s e t  up by t h e  Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and 
Environmental Control  (VROM). This priority se t t ing procedure was partly 
specified in t h e  Soil Clean-Up (interim) Act and made priority se t t ing 
1 primarily a provincial issue . 
'The provinces play a key role  in Dutch environmental policy and regulation. 
Without exception,  e a c h  province had taken some measures regarding soil 
pollution at t h e  t i m e  t h e  ministerial  procedure was proposed. Initially t h e  
priority se t t ing  procedure was unclear, and for th is  reason t h e  procedure 
and i t s  results  d i f f e r  somewhat  between provinces. Yet ,  a l l  provinces assign 
a high priority t o  those  cases where drinking wate r  i s  threathened (see 
page 28 of th i s  paper). In some provinces planned housing a r e a s  receive  
high priority (38). This is understandable s ince  municipalities a r e  obliged t o  
inform t h e  province of soil pollution, and most  housing a r e a s  a r e  
investigated before const ruct ion begins. 
Before investigations o r  c lean  up  measures a r e  t aken  t h e  provincial c lean 
up  programmes a r e  subjected t o  a t i m e  consuming checking procedure at 
t h e  ministry. This does not  appear  t o  change t h e  provincial priorities 
significantly. This procedure is, however, t ime  consuming, and provinces 
claim i t  i s  causing serious delays in pursuing soil pollution cases. In a 
recen t  evaluation of t h e  Soil Clean up  operation th is  complaint  has  been 
acknowledged and t h e  minis ter  has  promised t o  s top  preliminary checking of 
cases where l i t t l e  money is  involved (39). 
The application of t h e  c r i t e r i a  and  t h e  priority se t t ing  and  checking 
procedures c a n  be  seen  as formal  thresholds in t h e  decision procedure on  
soil clean up. Another important  threshold t o  ac tua l  c lean  up  i s  t h e  
availabil i ty of technical  facil i t ies.  All techniques available in 1981 originated 
f rom t h e  civil engineering f ie ld  and  could only be used fo r  temporary 
isolation. This problem was recognised ea r ly  by t h e  ministerial  s t a f f  and 
t w o  solutions were  planned. 
Firstly, a l l  provinces had t o  provide temporary s torage faci l i t ies  f o r  soil 
t h a t  could not  be  sanitized. The problems t h e  provinces experienced in 
se t t ing  up  t h e s e  faci l i t ies  w e r e  very similar t o  those  t h e  ministry 
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encountered in trying t o  implement  t h e  Hoffman plan . 
According t o  t h e  Soil Clean up  (interim) Act (51) t h e  provincial Aldermen 
have t o  draw up a yearly c lean up program. th is  program should include 
a priority classif ication of a l l  known cases of soil pollution in t h e  
province in question. 
These problems included a s t rong res is tance f rom local government and 
t h e  public (see also ~ i r v e n ) .  
The second r o u t e  was  to  in t roduce  incentives f o r  t h e  development  of soil 
c l ean  u p  techniques.  Because of t h e  pressure to  pu t  techniques  i n t o  use 
quickly, a t t e n t i o n  t o  o t h e r  environmental  domains (air and  w a t e r )  has  
decreased.  As a resul t ,  people living in t h e  vicini ty of a soil c l ean  up  
fac i l i ty  objec t  vehement ly  to  t h e  result ing a i r  o r  w a t e r  pollution. 
In conclusion, w e  c a n  distinguish t h r e e  impor tant  thresholds which influence 
whe the r  a c t i o n  i s  t a k e n  o n  a speci f ic  soil pollution case. The  f i r s t  i s  
considera t ion  of t h e  c r i t e r i a  t h a t  de te rmine  whe the r  a case will be 
considered o r  not. T h e  second i s  t h e  priority s e t t i n g  procedure  performed 
by t h e  provincial s t a f f ,  and  t h e  third i s  t h e  availabil i ty of t empora ry  
s t o r a g e  faci l i t ies .  Accordingly, a pollution case having t h e  g r e a t e s t  c h a n c e  
of being d e a l t  w i th  adequate ly  i s  one  t h a t  involves a smal l  amount  of 
polluted soil,  i s  s i t u a t e d  in t h e  vicinity of a ( fu ture)  housing o r  a w a t e r  
supply a r e a ,  and  i s  s i t e d  in a province where  t h e  author i t ies  have  provided 
t e m p o r a r y  s t o r a g e  faci l i t ies .  This may  not  be t h e  mos t  c r i t i ca l  c a s e  f rom a 
risk management  perspect ive  nor typical  of those  c a s e s  t h a t  have  m a d e  soil 
pollution a poli t ical  issue. The  formal  ra t ional i ty  of t h e  origgnal regulations 
and t h e  a c t u a l  ra t ional i t ies  of implementat ion,  a r e  very  d i f ferent .  
Antagonism be tween  loca l  government  and res idents  
The way  in  which t h e  Ministry crys ta l ized  t h e  soil c l ean  procedures 
indica tes  t h a t  t h e  problem was  perceived as t h e  managing of risk to public 
hea l th  and  t h e  environment .  From t h e  way t h e  procedures  a r e  implemented 
w e  c a n  see t h a t  t h e  t h r e a t  t o  public hea l th  h a s  become  t h e  fo remos t  issue, 
whereas  t h e  t h r e a t  t o  t h e  environment  has  fa l len  i n t o  t h e  background. The 
percept ion of so i l  pollution as a t h r e a t  t o  public hea l th  s e e m s  to  be  fa i r ly  
genera l  in t h e  Netherlands,  but  even  t h i s  percept ion pe rmi t s  widely 
d i f f e ren t  priori t ies,  according t o  severa l  organisat ional  fac tors .  
The percept ion of soil  pollution by both  t h e  c e n t r a l  government  and t h e  
municipali t ies has  been  influenced strongly by t h e  established f inancial  
s t ruc tu re .  O n c e  a case e m e r g e s  o n  t h e  poli t ical  agenda,  t h e  municipali t ies 
canno t  eas i ly  inf luence  i t  formal ly  and a t  t h a t  point  t h e y  lose a ce r t a in  
control over their  budget. Though this  loss of control is  undesirable t h e  
issue on the  official political agenda is t h e  threat  t o  public health and only 
arguments in those t e rms  can  be ventilated publicly. As a result t h e  
municipal government welcomes optimistic interpretations of t h e  available 
information regarding public health consequences and downplays t h e  
importance of inherent uncertainties in data ,  if these do  not show evidence 
of immediate risks. 
The opposite may be expected of t he  local population. Soil pollution 
means a health t h r ea t  of unknown dimensions which might lead t h e  public 
t o  demand - ' a  w o r s t  c a s e '  approach t o  evaluating uncertain data.  Seen 
in this perspective, i t  is remarkable t h a t  in most of t h e  soil pollution cases  
t he  local population appeared not t o  be overly concerned. Even in 
those cases where people live on  such s i tes  they reacted only mildly t o  t h e  
national soil pollution upheaval. For instance, in Gouderak, where waste  
from the  Shell aldrinldieldrin plant (at  Pernis) was dumped in t h e  fift ies,  
t he  residents were reluctant t o  do anything about i t .  Yet,  in cer ta in  cases 
(like t h e  th ree  we describe Volgermeerpolder, Griftpark and Merwedepolder), 
there  was a large public reaction. 
There is  no simple and obvious reason why public concern arose in t h e  
cases  mentioned and not  in other  cases. A general fea ture  of t h e  cases  
considered is  a history of distrust  dating back t o  t h e  t ime  before 
soil pollution was a n  issue. Once the  public became concerned, some 
features  can be identified t h a t  appear t o  keep this  concern growing. These 
fea tures  a r e  not necessarily specific t o  soil pollution, but may be 
recognized in other  confrontations between local authorit ies and residents. 
Though t h e  arguments specific a r e  about soil pollution, they may be  
masking more general conflicts between t h e  residents and t h e  public 
authorities. Another general fea ture  of these cases is  t he  lack of experience 
in handling this type  of problem on t h e  par t  of all t h e  parties concerned. 
Official bodies were plagued by institutional uncertainties: no well known 
procedure exist t o  deal with ei ther  political o r  technical aspects. It is 
natural t ha t  these officials tr ied t o  avoid routes of act ion which threw 
them into ye t  more uncertainty. 
As noted above, t h e  soil pollution issue in t h e  Netherlands i s  deal t  with 
primarily as a risk-management problem. In some cases,  very rigourous 
procedures existed for example, to reduce risks re la ted t o  drinking wa te r  
supply. The history of Lekkerkerk i l lustrates this point. It was not until t h e  
drinking wa te r  appeared to  conta in  pollutants t h a t  t h e  environmental  
inspectora te  took ac t ion  by ordering emergency rat ioning of drinking water .  
Two weeks  l a t e r  t h e  regional  public heal th  inspector considered th i s  ac t ion  
inadequate,  and i t  was  decided to  e v a c u a t e  t h e  a rea .  
In general ,  no  procedures  ex i s t  to dea l  wi th  soil pollution. Local 
government,  t h e r e f o r e  shapes  t h e  problem and i t s  handling in a d  hoc  
fashion. As will be i l lus t ra ted  by t h e  following case ,  local  government 
ac t ions  a r e  driven by m o r e  general  a ims  l ike pacifying t h e  resident,  
avoiding negat ive  publicity, and  avoiding unknown financial  obligations. 
The Volgermeerpolder 1 
The  Volgermeerpolder i s  a re fuse  t i p  belonging to  t h e  
municipality of Amsterdam. Besides being t h e  main user of 
t h e  t ip,  t h e  municipali ty had t h e  legal  du ty  of controll ing 
t h e  l icense fo r  t h e  t i p  under t h e  Nuisance Act. Already 
before  1960 people demanded closure of t h e  t i p  because  of 
t h e  s t ench  i t  produced. The demand was  ignored. When in 
t h e  spring of 1980 barre ls  containing w a s t e  originating f rom 
Philips Duphar w e r e  seen  o n  t h e  s i t e  (so shor t ly  a f t e r  
'Lekkerkerk')  a n  off ic ia l  working group was  set u p  to  
coordinate r esea rch  o n  t h e  consequences. On April 29, 1980, 
t h e  municipality of Amsterdam issued a press r epor t  s t a t ing  
t h a t  100 to 200 barre ls  had been found f i l led  with 
p ly-chlorbenzenes  (4 1). As a consequence of th i s  press 
r epor t ,  a memorandum was wri t ten  by a biochemist  and 
resident of Broek in Waterland, a smal l  municipali ty n e a r  
t h e  s i t e  of t h e  pollution. In th is  m e m o  a t t e n t i o n  was  called 
t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t ,  s ince  t h e  barrels  or ig inated f r o m  t h e  
Philips Duphar, s i t e  where  in 1963 a plant  producing 2,4,5-T 
had exploded, i t  might  b e  t h e  c a s e  t h a t  t h e  Philips Duphar 
was te  conta ins  2,3,7,8-TCDD (commonly r e f e r r e d  to  a s  
dioxin) (40). Immediate ly  following t h i s  m e m o  t h e  
municipality of Broek in Waterland issued a press r e p o r t  in 
which i t  asked t h e  municipali ty of Amsterdam to  be given 
be t t e r .  in fo rmat ion  abou t  t h e  exist ing s i tuat ion and fo r  m o r e  
research to b e  conduc ted  on  t h e  possible dispersion of tox ic  
was te  ( they did no t  r eques t  a n  investigation of t h e  con ten t s  
of t h e  barrels). The  municipality a l so  demanded admission as 
a member  of t h e  off ic ia l  working group. This demand  was  
acknowledged. 
Details  of t h e  h is tor ica l  p a r t  ( f i rs t  half of t h e  c a s e  study) have  
mainly been t aken  f rom t w o  reports: o n e  by M. Hisschemoller (40) 
and another  by a n  Amsterdam project  group (41). 
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The number of barrels at t h e  t i p  was es t imated  t o  be around 
5000 barrels of 200 l i t e r s  each.  Due t o  t h e  growing alarm 
among t h e  inhabitants of Broek in Watfrland a commit tee ,  t h e  
Burger C o m i t e e  (BC) Vuilnisstortplaats was set up. The BC's 
demands for  admission as a member  of t h e  official working 
group was f i r s t  refused, but l a t e r  acknowledged (40). It a lso  
demanded closure of t h e  re fuse  tip. A range of chlorinated 
hydrocarbons had been measured in samples t aken  from t h e  t i p  
and several  researchers  f rom dif ferent  insti tutions had measured 
dioxin. 
In ea r ly  1981, t h e  official  working group issued a detailed 
repor t  of t h e  quanti t ies and  kinds of chemicals found at t h e  
refuse  tip. About 10.000 barre ls  were  found at t h e  t ip,  of 
which about 8000 were  es t imated  t o  contain polychlorbenzenes 
and  about 2000 hexachlorcyclohexane. Also some barrels 
containing o ther  organochlorines w e r e  found, among which was 
t h e  herbicide 2,4,5-T polluted with dioxin. The repor t  s t a t e d  
t h a t  t h e  local  population did no t  run higher risks than t h e  
Dutch population in general  and t h a t  no  pollution had been 
found in t a p  water.  The r e p o r t  suggested measures t o  prevent 
t h e  spreading of pollution and  fu r the r  research on  t h e  presence 
of dioxin (41). 
Shortly a f t e r  toxic  substances  were  measured in samples of t a p  
w a t e r  in Broek in Waterland. Although t h e  origin could not  be 
t r a c e d  definitively t o  t h e  t ip,  i t  was  decided t h a t  some plastic 
conduit  pipes under a di tch  leading t o  t h e  t i p  had t o  be 
subst i tu ted by m e t a l  ones  (41). The e f f e c t  of t h e  find was t h a t  
t h e  wa te r  adminis t ra tor  of t h e  a r e a ,  t h e  Hoogheemraadschap 
v w r  d e  Ui twaterende Sluizen, ordered t h e  municipality of 
Amsterdam t o  close down t h e  refuse  t i p  within t w o  weeks. On 
February 6, 1981, t h e  C o u r t  of Mayor and Aldermen of 
Amsterdam decided t o  c lose  down t h e  t i p  and  t o  s t a r t  
execut ion of t h e  Lepelplan ( ' s p o o n  p l a n 1 ) ,  which m e a n t  t h a t  
several  hundred barrels lying at t h e  su r face  would be 'spooned 
out '  and deposited in a c e n t r a l  p lace  at t h e  tip. The original 
idea  t o  wrap  t h e  barre ls  in polythene was  changed d u e  t o  
pressure by t h e  BC. They would now be wrapped in s t e e l  
conta iners  (40). 
As in Lekkerkerk, in th i s  case off ic ia l  ac t ion was  t aken  only when t h e  
drinking w a t e r  supply was thought  t o  be endangered. Although t h e  w a t e r  
author i t ies  
The BC had a c o r e  of abou t  10-12 persons surrounded by a f luctuat ing 
group of volunteers living in Broek in Waterland. I t  also availed itself of 
t h e  exper t ise  of about  t e n  e x p e r t s  in d i f ferent  fields, among them t w o  
biochemists, one  biologist, one  hydrogeologist and one  general  practi t ioner 
(42). Being formally a working group of t h e  Vereniging t o t  Behoud van 
Waterland (VBW) t h e  BC a t t a i n e d  legal  s t a t u s  which enabled i t  t o  
l i t igate.  The objective of th is  association (vBw) was t o  maintain and 
advance t h e  natural  hab i ta t  in Waterland. 
would likely have had m o r e  diff icult ies in closing down t h e  t i p  in t h e  
absence  of public unrest ,  at s t a k e  in th is  badly defined decision problem 
was  t h e  author i ty  of governmental  institutions. 
There  i s  ano the r  parallel  wi th  Lekkerkerk, namely t h e  supposed presence of 
a carcinogen. In Lekkerkerk,  benzene was f i r s t  measured in  t h e  spaces  
under t h e  houses; ye t ,  t h e r e  had been a previous investigation in which no 
benzene had been shown. Therefore  t h e  technical  working group in charge  
requested resea rch  by independent expert ise.  In t w o  such  reviews no  
benzene was  shown. The resu l t s  of these  more  reassuring reviews,  however, 
w e r e  not  known to minister  Ginjaar when i t  was decided to e v a c u a t e  t h e  
res idents  and to clean u p  t h e  Lekkerkerk West a rea .  
The Lekkerkerk exper ience  may have influenced t h e  way in which a similar  
i ssue  was  approached in t h e  Volgermeerpolder. Whereas t h e  amounts  of most  
of t h e  measured pollutants wen t  a lmost  uncontested,  t h e  presence and 
amounts  of dioxin, which is  considered to  be a potent  carcinogen,  was  a 
very controversial  issue. Hisschemoller, who has studied t h e  history of t h e  
Volgermeerpolder in deta i l ,  concluded t h a t  t h e  municipality of Amsterdam 
showed se lec t ive  cau t ion  wi th  respec t  t o  t h e  dioxin pollution. Twice  t h e  
Governmental  Ins t i tu te  f o r  Public Health (RIV) in Bilthoven was  asked to 
conf i rm t h e  presence of dioxin, but only negat ive  resul ts  w e r e  published. 
This led  t o  a a press  r epor t  s t a t i n g  t h a t  no dioxin had been measured in 
w a t e r  and sludge. Indeed, RIV had not been ab le  to  measure  dioxin in 
sludge. But a week  be fore  t h e  press repor t  was issued a dioxin f ind by t h e  
Laboratory f o r  t h e  Environment of t h e  University of Amsterdam had been 
repor ted  to  t h e  Aldermen, by t h e  Cen t ra l  Municipal Laboratory f o r  t h e  
Environment of t h e  C i t y  of Amsterdam (Gemeenteli jk Cen t raa l  
Milieu-laboratorium, GCM). And GCM was undoubtely impl ica ted in  f raming 
t h e  press report .  
The RIV ( ~ i j k s i n s t i t u u t  v o o r  d e  ~ o l k s g e z o n d h e i d )  was  t h e  l a rges t  
single r esea rch  ins t i tu te  of t h e  Dutch government and had t h e  s t a t u s  
of a s e p a r a t e  d i r e c t o r a t e  genera l  at t h e  Depar tment  of Public Health. 
On January 1 1984 RIV was  merged with t w o  o t h e r  governmental  
r e sea rch  ins t i tu tes  IVA ( l n s t i  t u u t  v o o r  Af v a l s t o f  f e n  o n d e r z o e k )  
and RID ( ~ i  j k s i n s t i t u u t  v o o r  d e  ~ r i n k w a t e r v o o r z i e n i n g )  i n t o  
RIVM ( R i j k s i n t i t u u t  v o o r  V o l k s g e z o n d h e i d  e n  M i l i e u z a k e n ,  
g o v e r n m e n t a l  i n s t i t u t e  f o r  p u b l i c  h e a l t h  a n d  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  
a f  f a i  r s). Accordingly i t s  off ic ia l  field of research has been  broadened 
wi th  environmental  research.  
In t h e  spring of 1981 t h e  presence of dioxin was no longer 
contested.  The issue became whether the  concentrations of 
dioxin present in t h e  Volgermeerpolder formed a danger t o  
public health. The discussion concentra ted on  t h e  alleged 
carcinogenity of dioxin. The e s t ima t e  of t h e  potential daily 
in take of dioxin by people living q y u n d  t h e  refuse t i p  was 
100-150 picogram (1 picogram = 10- gram) (43). Despite t h e  
uncertainties t h a t  surround such a n  es t imate  i t  was not debated 
by any of t h e  parties concerned. This may have been due t o  
t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  es t imate  by t h e  municipal health service  
amounted t o  150 pg, and t h e  one  proposed by Copius 
Peereboom, a n  exper t  siding with t h e  residents was 100-150 pg. 
The deba te  instead centered around t h e  issue whether dioxin 
should be considered l t o  be a normal tox ic  substance o r  a 
(complete) carcinogen . It  was held t ha t  in t h e  l a t t e r  case no 
maximal daily intake can  be established at which no  e f f ec t s  
occur. All part ies in t h e  deba te  took t h e  view tha t ,  if dioxin 
i s  taken t o  be a complete  carcinogen then  a norm established 
by t h e  World Health Organisation (WHO) should be accepted.  
This norm holds t h a t  one ex t r a  casualty due t o  cancer  should 
be accepted in 70 years in a population of one  million people 
exposed. 
According t o  a repor t  by RIV of November 1980, which 
considered dioxin as a complete  carcinogen, this would yield a n  
accep tab le  daily in take of 1 3  picogram (44). The policy of t h e  
municipality of Amsterdam, however, was t h a t  a norm for  
dioxin should be calculated in t h e  s ame  way as fo r  a normal 
tox ic  substance, which yielded an  acceptable  daily in take of 240 
pg per person. This was a difference of 20x, and was mos t  
re levant  in view of t h e  maximal daily intake t h a t  was held t o  
be possible (100-150 pg). This norm was t o  be proposed in a 
second repor t  by RIV according t o  which dioxin was not  
considered t o  be a carcinogen (45). The deba te  was s t rongest  in 
t h e  period before this second repor t  was published. The main 
contes ted point was whether dioxin was a carcinogen. The 
deba te  c a m e  into  t h e  open in a television broadcast on  
November 22 1981 (46). In th i s  broadcast  Heida, t h e  di rector  of 
GCM, debated with Copius Peereboom. Heida held t h a t  
according t o  a broad scient i f ic  forum dioxin i s  not a complete  
carcinogen, but c an  only promote cancer. He based his thesis 
on t h e  repor t  by RIV t h a t  had not ye t  been published, and on  
t h e  f a c t  t h a t  secretary  of state Lambers-Hacquebard endorsed 
t h e  conclusion of t h e  promised report. If dioxin was not  t aken  
t o  be a complete carcinogen, and accordingly was held t o  have ' ' 
a threshold beneath which no  toxic  e f f e c t  would occur,  t h e  
quanti t ies of dioxin 
A dif ference was made, between on t h e  one hand compounds t h a t  
could promote cancers  but not  induce them (promotors), which could be  
dea l t  with as ' n o r m a l  t o x i c  s u b s t a n c e s ' ,  and on  t h e  other  hand 
genotoxic compounds t h a t  were  supposed t o  be able t o  induce and -
promote cancers; t h e  l a t t e r  were  called complete  carcinogens. 
present did not constitute a toxic intake. 
Uncertainty played a central  role in t he  debate ,  as was made 
explicit by Copius Peereboom. He based his conclusion tha t  
t he  situation was not safe on the  earlier report  issued by RIV, 
in which a level of 13 pg was held t o  be acceptable.  Because 
t he  new report  had not yet been published, Copius Peereboom 
concluded t h a t  no scientific forum existed t o  endorse t h e  
new conclusions drawn by RIV. He emphasized t h e  
inconclusiveness of t he  situation, and concluded t h a t  for  this 
reason the  municipality of Amsterdam could not hold t h a t  no 
danger t o  public health existed, whereas on the  o ther  hand 
Heida persistently s ta ted  tha t  the  same could be safely 
assumed. 
The question of t h e  dioxin norm, and t h e  associated risk fo r  
public health,  was highly topical until t he  publication of t h e  
second RIV report  in 1982 and t h e  termination of t h e  execution 
of t he  Lepelplan. Activities around the  Volgermeerpolder then 
fell  away, since all  parties agreed tha t  a definitive solution fo r  
the  pollution i~ the  Volgermeerpolder could not be expected in 
t he  short run . 
' Science1 in t he  Policy Arena 
In a soil pollution case like t h e  Volgermeerpolder i t  i s  taken t o  be 
important t o  determine whether or not there  'is' a risk t o  public health. 
For t h e  Amsterdam authorit ies 'no risk1 meant t h a t  no act ion had t o  be 
taken; whereas t he  exis tence of a risk meant extensive act ion with severe 
financial consequences. It also meant admission of i t s  own inadequacy with 
respect t o  t h e  control of t h e  refuse tip. For these reasons, i t  i s  not 
surprising tha t  t h e  Amsterdam authorities tr ied t o  prove t h a t  no risk 
existed, whereas t h e  residents tried t o  show the  opposite. These parties, 
respectively, argued a ' b e s t 1  and a ' w o r s t '  case for  t h e  situation at 
hand. In this arena,  t h e  two reports by RIV played a crucial role, and, 
therefore,  i t  i s  worth examining why these reports c a m e  t o  such different 
conclusions. 
1 Winsemius, Minister of VROM s ta ted  in an  interview t h a t  with t h e  
present financial possibilities, clean up of t h e  refuse t ip  would be 
delayed for  f ive t o  ten  years (47). The BC sympathized with t h e  
financial problems, but expected t ha t  industry (in this case Duphar) could 
be obliged t o  pay par t  of t h e  clean up costs  (42). The government plans 
t o  require Duphar t o  pay. In addition, t he  act ivi t ies  of t he  national 
environmental movement with respect t o  t h e  Volgermeerpolder have 
diminished t o  virtually zero  (48). 
The f i r s t  repor t  r eac ted  t o  press publications on a number of c a n c e r s  in 
Kootwijk (a smal l  village surrounded by forest) ,  allegedly caused by 
occasional exposure t o  t h e  herbicide 2,4,5-T, polluted with dioxin. RIV 
concluded in th is  r a the r  hastily wri t ten  repor t  (441, t h a t  occasional 
exposure t o  2,4,5-T could not be t h e  cause  of cancer.  In reaching th is  
conclusion, t h e  authors  evaluated t h e  carcinogenity of both 2,4,5-T and 
dioxin, concluding f rom t h r e e  review a r t i c les  t h a t  dioxin could act as a 
mutagenic substance and, therefore ,  should be considered a 
carcinogen. Even when th i s  cautious s tand was t aken  i t  could be 
concluded t h a t  no cancer  risk was present in Kootwijk, because of t h e  
very low concentrations of dioxin calcula ted f o r  t h e  si tuation.  It 
addressed a s i tuat ion di f ferent  from t h a t  of t h e  Volgermeerpolder, where  
t h e  es t imated dioxin in take was of t h e  s a m e  order  of magni tude as t h e  
acceptable  intake,  and f o r  th i s  reason t h e  authors  w e r e  asked t o  
reassess t h e  risk of dioxin (49). As mentioned above, at  t h a t  t i m e  t h e  
permanent advisory c o m m i t t e e  of t h e  Ministry of Public Health had 
proposed t o  divide carcinogenic compounds in to  t w o  ca tegor ies  according 
t o  whether they  were  considered t o  be a complete  carc inogen o r  a 
promotor only, and t o  use di f ferent  normsett ing procedures fo r  both. 
A crucial change in t h e  second RIV repor t  i s  t h a t  t h e  mutagenic i ty  
of dioxin is evaluated differently. Whereas t h e  f i r s t  r epor t  cautiously 
concludes t h a t  mutagenity of dioxin cannot  be excluded, t h e  second o n e  
reevaluates t h e  d a t a  and now concludes in t h e  negat ive  (51). Being no 
mutagen, dioxin i s  not  a comple te  carcinogen and fa l ls  in to  ano ther  
normsett ing regime, in which a threshold level exis ts  under which t h e r e  
is  no toxic  e f fec t .  Using a n  arbi t rar i ly  chosen sa fe ty  f a c t o r  of 250 t h e  
norm of 240 pg is  set. I t  i s  in teres t ing t h a t  both t h e  original value  of 
1 3  pg and  t h e  new value of 240 pg w e r e  calcula ted by using t h e  s a m e  
set of experimental  d a t a  namely t h e  results  of only o n e  animal  
experiment by Kociba et al. (50). The changed in tegrat ion was 
occasioned by a supposedly di f ferent  cancer-inducing mechanism, which, 
in turn,  was occasioned by a re-evaluation of t h e  l i t e ra tu re ,  where  
several  exper iments  were  evaluated slightly differently (51). As a resul t ,  
t h e  t en ta t ive  positive conclusion on  t h e  mutagenity of dioxin f rom t h e  
f i r s t  repor t  was reversed t o  a negat ive  conclusion in t h e  second repor t .  
I t  is, however, n o t  only t h e  re-evaluation of t h e  mutagenic i ty  which 
must be seen as re levant  for  t h e  di f ference in results ,  but  a lso  t h e  f a c t  
t h a t  i t  became re levant  t o  put t h e  question whether  a compound i s  a 
carcinogen of a cer ta in  type,  instead of simply carcinogenic. The way 
t h e  two  norms for  dioxin were  established i s  a c l e a r  example  of t h e  
way ' s c i e n c e '  c a n  be re in terpre ted depending o n  t h e  re levan t  problem and 
problem frame.  It i s  worth emphasizing t h a t  t h e  t i m e s  at which both norms 
w e r e  put  forward w e r e  less than  t h r e e  months  a p a r t ,  and  by t h e  s a m e  
inst i tut ion.  Therefore,  t h e  d i f ferences  c a n  not  be explained by changed 
evaluat ion c r i t e r i a  of t h e  sc ient is ts  in question, nor by a di f fe ren t  d a t a  set. 
R a t h e r  t h e y  a r e  explained by t h e  d i f ferences  in  t h e  s i tua t ion  fo r  which 
norms had t o  be suggested (see also Brian Wynne, chap te r  3). In th is  case, 
r isk-management policies cr i t ica l ly  influence t h e  in te rp re ta t ion  of t h e  
sc ient i f ic  risk assessment da ta ,  the reby  throwing in to  question t h e  generally 
accep ted  paradigm, t h a t  risk assessment  and risk-management a r e  
independent ' s c i e n t i f  i c l  and ' p o l i c y '  aci t ivi t ies.  
Although t h e  soil pollution issue in t h e  Netherlands comes  o n  t h e  political 
agenda  as a risk management  problem, as w e  have shown from t h e  
Lekkerkerk and Volgermeer cases, th is  does  n o t  mean t h a t  risk management  
i s  t h e  c e n t r a l  issue fo r  e a c h  of t h e  part icipating groups o r  bodies. I t  only 
means  t h a t  risk for public heal th  is  a c c e p t e d  as t h e  poli t ical  issue for 
which a c t i o n  by t h e  author i t ies  c a n  b e  justified. ' R i s k 1 ,  t h e n  i s  t h e  
acknowledged issue if no t  t h e  rea l  issue underlying act ion,  as will be seen,  
for  example ,  by t h e  group of res idents  in t h e  Gri f tpark  case, described 
below. 
The G r i f t  park (52) 
A soil pollution problem a rose  o n  t h e  G r i f t  Park  in May 
1980, well before  t h e  e n a c t m e n t  of t h e  Soil C lean  Up 
(interim) Act. Four yea r s  l a t e r ,  i t  was  s t i l l  receiving press  
coverage.  The s t rong involvement of t h e  local  population in 
th is  soil polution case can,  in pa r t ,  be  explained by ac t ions  
and commi tments  dat ing f u r t h e r  back t h a n  May, 1980. 
The  Gr i f t  park lies in a nineteenth  cen tu ry  neighbourhood in 
t h e  c i ty  of Ut rech t  and i s  owned by t h e  municipality. The  
s i t e  was  formerly used as a n  occasional  rubbish dump and 
as a n  industrial s i te .  The  municipal g a s  works and a printing 
company had been loca ted  o n  i t .  Since t h e  ea r ly  60 's  t h e  
a r e a  had been neglected and  t h e  res idents  of t h e  
neighbourhood had begun t o  use i t  as a park a n d  a 
recreat ion ground fo r  children. 
In March 1971 t h e  c i t y  council  decided t h a t  t h e  s i t e  would 
be used instead f o r  residential  building and f o r  t h e  
es tabl ishment  of t h e  municipal w a s t e  removal  depar tment .  
T h e  res idents  objected t o  t h e  proximity of t h e  d e p a r t m e n t  
and resented t h e  loss of the i r  green a r e a  and as a resul t  
t h e  council reversed i t s  decision in  April 1973. The  s i t e ,  
s t i l l  a wasteland,  was  formally opened t o  t h e  public; 
however, lobbying fo r  residential housing for  t h e  s i t e  
continued. The residents formed a n  act ion group and pressed 
t h e  municipality t o  reshape par t  of t h e  s i t e  in to  a park, 
and t o  use ano ther  pa r t  fo r  house building. This ac t ion  was 
succesfull; in May 1978 t h e  council accep ted  a s t r u c t u r e  
plan fo r  t h e  land use of t h e  s i t e  t h a t  complied wi th  t h e  
demands of t h e  residents. The commitment  of t h e  res idents  
t o  th is  s t r u c t u r e  plan strongly influenced the i r  react ions  t o  
t h e  discovered soil pollution, and l a te r  thei r  react ions  t o  
proposals f o r  t h e  solution of t h e  soil pollution problem. 
In May, 1980 Grif t  park became a soil pollution case. 
Playing children found a barrel of corrosive acid (which 
l a t e r  turned ou t  t o  be 62v/v% sulphuric acid), and t w o  days 
l a t e r  a n  ex-worker of t h e  fo rmer  printing company informed 
t h e  act ion group t h a t  his f irm had illegally been dumping 
toluene on  t h e  s i t e  f o r  many years (53). Since publicity 
around t h e  Lekkerkerk case was only just peaking, these  
findings c r e a t e d  a fu rore  in t h e  c i ty  dis t r ic ts  surrounding 
t h e  Grift  park. A sharp  conflict  arose  between t h e  residents 
and  t h e  c i t y  council over t h e  question whether  t h e  s i t e  
formed a risk t o  public health. The issue at s t a k e  became 
whether  t h e  s i t e  could remain open t o  t h e  public o r  should 
(in par t )  be fenced in t o  protect ,  amongst o thers ,  playing 
children from c o n t a c t  with pollution. 
In response t o  t h e  announcement of t h e  council t h a t  a n  
initial survey of t h e  s i te ,  including some chemical  analyses, 
had been s t a r t e d ,  t h e  residents formed a n  ac t ion  group: t h e  
Gif c o m m i t t e e  (l g i f l  means p o i s o n 1  1. Their a im was t o  
put pressure o n  t h e  council. The Gif c o m m i t t e e  asked t h e  
CWU (Chemistry Shop Utrecht ,  a n  organisation consisting 
mainly of chemist ry  students,  and connected wi th  t h e  
University of Utrecht)  t o  provide counter-expertise and  t o  
make i t s  own investigations with respect  t o  t h e  occurrence 
of toxic pollutants in t h e  soil of t h e  si te.  
During this period t h e  municipality adhered t o  t h e  no-risk 
proposition ( the  s i tuat ion i s  s a f e  until i t  i s  evident  t h a t  i t  
i s  not), whereas  t h e  act ion group took t h e  risk proposition 
( the  s i tuat ion mus t  be  regarded as unsafe until i t  i s  evident  
t h a t  i t  is not). The council repeatedly found reassuring 
in terpreta t ions  of its investigations. The Gif commi t tee ,  in 
turn,  used i t s  exper t ise  t o  show t h a t  these  investigations 
were  no t  conclusive, and offered a l t e rna t ive  d a t a  and  
interpretations.  In t h e  meant ime t h e  barrel of sulphuric acid,  
(provisionally fenced in with barbed wire), remained lying on  
t h e  s i t e  fo r  s o m e  weeks as a symbol of o f fence  t o  t h e  
inhabitants. 
This polarisation of t h e  part icipants,  where  t h e  author i t ies  defend t h e  best 
case in terpreta t ion and t h e  act ion group adheres  t o  t h e  wors t  case 
interpretation,  i s  probably typical  fo r  soil pollution cases when t h e  issue 
concerns a t h r e a t  t o  public health,  and t h e  scan t  d a t a  leave room f o r  both 
in terpre ta t ions .  We witnessed a similar  s i tuat ion in t h e  Volgermeer case. 
In t h e  Gri f tpark  case, in June  t h e  CWU discovered a th ick  
layer of coal  t a r ,  which was  l a t e r  shown to  have 
concentra t ions  of t o x i c  and carcinogenic compounds 
(aromates). The C i t y  Council,  then,  conceded to  t h e  c la ims 
of t h e  Gif c o m m i t t e e  about  t h e  public hea l th  risk of t h e  
s i te ,  and t h e  s i t e  was  fenced  in. The no-risk a r g u m e n t  
ceased being a n  issue between t h e  municipality a n d  t h e  
ac t ion  group. 
However, t h e  ac t ion group realized,  ea r ly  on, t h a t  t h e  soil 
pollution posed a serious barrier  to t h e  execut ion of t h e  
fo rmer  plans f o r  t h e  a rea .  This perception pervaded a l l  
fu r the r  ac t ions  of t h e  Gif commi t t ee .  
Af te r  t h e  a c c e p t a n c e  of t h e  pollution s i tuat ion a s  such,  t h e  
municipality was confronted with serious uncertainty:  t h e r e  
was  no  legal  f ramework,  no  a c c e p t e d  division of 
responsibilities for  fu r the r  ac t ion,  n o  known and feas ible  way 
t o  c lean  up t h e  pollution, and  n o  indication of wha t  t h e  
costs would be and  who should pay fo r  them. Significantly 
t h e  absence of a test f ramework t o  assess t h e  e x t e n t  of 
t h e  pollution at di f fe ren t  spots o n  t h e  s i t e  does no t  appear  
to  have  been a barr ier  f o r  fur ther  action;  probably t h e  
concentra t ions  then known w e r e  above any  value c r i t i ca l  fo r  
action.  
Fur ther  investigations w e r e  in i t ia ted  to  assess t h e  e x t e n t  of 
t h e  pollution o n  t h e  s i t e ,  in l a t i tude  as well as in depth.  
The  behavioural uncer ta in t ies  mentioned c a n  be held 
responsible fo r  t h e  slow progress as demons t ra ted  by  t h e  
following: 
- only in June, 1981, did i t  become c l e a r  t h a t  c e n t r a l  
government would pay for  a substantial  amount  of t h e  
costs of t h e  c l e a n  u p  operation;  
- only in t h e  a u t u m n  of 1981 (a f t e r  in May of t h e  s a m e  
year t h e  d r a f t  Soil Clean Up (interim) Act  had been 
published) did civil  se rvan t s  of t h e  province begin 
deliberations wi th  plausible c lean u p  firms.  . 
( ~ o t e  t h a t  provincial author i t ies  w e r e  responsible fo r  
deciding between c lean up possibilities and fo r  supervising 
c lean  up operations). 
In t h e  mean t ime  t h e  Gif c o m m i t t e e  was  fully occupied 
ensuring t h e  execut ion of t h e  s t ruc tu re  plan and  pressing 
t h e  authorit ies t o  speed up the  decision process. New 
information was provided more freely by the  municipality, 
and was scrutinized for possible consequences fo r  the  
s t ructure  plan. They generated a plan (54) in which parts of 
the  s t ruc ture  plan could be executed at some locations on 
the  s i te ,  while on o ther  locations clean-up operations could 
s t a r t  simultaneously. This plan was presented t o  t h e  City 
Council and partly adopted by the  municipality, which was 
even granted a municipal award for  environmental activities. 
Meanwhile t h e  local population organised a demonstration 
and a n  exhibition concerning the  s i te  situation. 
A strong organisation was of vital importance for  t he  
impact of t he  Gif committee. The organisation was 
horizontal, t he  members of the  committee and t h e  number 
of members varied in t ime, depending on  t h e  expertise 
needed and the  intensity of the activit ies (somewhat t o  t he  
annoyance of t h e  municipal officials). When discussions with 
t he  authorit ies became technical, feedback was given t o  the 
local population by distributing information papers, by 
organizing public meetings, and by resorting t o  highly visible 
actions. Contacts  with (especially small l e f t  wing) political 
parties in t he  municipal council, with t he  press and with 
municipal - and l a t e r  provincial - civil servants were 
established without having a clear distribution of 
responsibilities among the  members of t he  Gif committee.  
The horizontal s t ructure  was very effect ive,  also in t h e  
mobilization of desired expertise, and in t ime  t h e  action 
group was considered a serious discussion partner by t h e  
authorities. 
In t h e  autumn of 1981, t h e  attention of t h e  Gif commit tee  
shifted from t h e  municipal t o  the  provincial authorit ies since 
t he  l a t t e r  has responsibility for  t h e  clean-up operations. It 
had become clear  t h a t  t he  municipality and t h e  action 
commit tee  had converged t o  a roughly similar perception of 
t h e  soil pollution case, although the  residents were more 
strongly commit ted t o  t he  original s t ructure  plan. For a 
year negotiations between the  province and clean up firms 
dragged on, because a t  t ha t  t ime the re  simply were  no 
techniques available t o  deal adequately with t he  vast 
pollution. 
These negotiations were scrutinized and crit icized by t h e  Gif 
commit tee ,  and new suggestions were made t o  faci l i ta te  
matters.  Finally, in January 1983, t h e  clean up operation 
was s tar ted.  The major part  of t he  polluted soil was dug 
out,  transported t o  another location, heated t o  300 C t o  
evaporate t h e  a romat ic  organic substances - these volatiles 
were burned a t  800 C before emission - and replaced on 
the  original site. The to ta l  costs were est imated t o  amount 
t o  12 million Dutch guilders (about 5 million US dollars). 
The Gif commit tee ,  as such, was formally dissolved, but 
some expert  representatives of t h e  residents were asked t o  
participate in a provincial technical working group tha t  
evaluated and supervised t h e  progress of t h e  clean-up 
operation. In t he  meantime house construction had begun 
on clean a r e a s  of t h e  si te.  
The clean-up opera t ion continued during t h e  g r e a t e r  p a r t  of 
1983, a t t r a c t i n g  only minor public at tention.  But by t h e  e n d  
of t h e  yea r  i t  b e c a m e  c l e a r  t h a t  digging o u t  a l l  t h e  
polluted soil  was not  possible s ince  t h e  e x t e n t  of t h e  
pollution was  much g r e a t e r  (especially in depth) t h a n  had 
been envisaged. The clean-up operation was  in ter rupted to 
eva lua te  t h e  new da ta .  Again suspicion arose  among  t h e  
residents who perceived ano the r  se tback to t h e  execut ion of 
t h e  s t ruc tu re  plan. Following th i s  new information t h e  
perceptions of t h e  provincial author i t ies  became more  c lear ly  
visible. The pollution was  regarded as a major t h r e a t  t o  t h e  
quali ty of t h e  groundwater beneath  t h e  site. 
As noted above,  much a t t en t ion  i s  devoted in t h e  
Netherlands to maintaining t h e  quality of t h e  groundwater.  
The management  of groundwater  reserves  i s  legally t h e  t a sk  
of provinces which act in close co-operation wi th  t h e  
publicly owned drinking w a t e r  companies. Therefore,  if t h e  
quality of t h e  drinking w a t e r  becomes a n  issue, i m m e d i a t e  
ac t ion c a n  be expected,  as was  t h e  case in Lekkerkerk and  
t h e  Volgermeerpolder. Regarding t h e  quality of t h e  drinking 
wa te r  t h e r e  i s  no  behavioural uncertainty among t h e  
authori t ies;  t h e  no  risk option pervades all measures,  which 
c a n  be easily e f fec ted .  
Indeed, t h e  local  drinking w a t e r  company had shown i n t e r e s t  
in t h e  Gri f tpark  case e a r l y  on, and had analyzed 
groundwater samples and m a d e  explici t  demands with respec t  
to t h e  clean-up opera t ion (55). The Gif c o m m i t t e e  had a l so  
asked fo r  groundwater analyses,  bu t  this  c o m m i t t e e  was  
more  in teres ted  in t h e  n e a r  s u r f a c e  groundwater and i t s  
e f f e c t s  on  public hea l th  condit ions in t h e  fu tu re  park. I t  
was  hardly in te res ted  in groundwater  quality at  a dep th  o f ,  
say, below f ive  to t e n  meters .  So, when at t h e  e n d  of 1983 
i t  became c lea r  to a l l  par t ies  t h a t  excavating t h e  pollution 
to t h e  dep ths  i t  had migra ted  was  financially infeasible, t h e  
contours of a new conf l ic t  be tween  t h e  res idents  a n d  now 
t h e  provincial au thor i t i e s  w e r e  shaped. The provincial 
author i t ies  tended mainly t o  f inance  measures  beneath  t h e  
su r face  level. In r e c e n t  plans a 42 m e t e r s  d e e p  wall i s  
proposed (56) to insula te  t h e  pollution f rom t h e  surrounding 
groundwater, a measure  which will cost u p  to 40-60 million 
guilders according to  r e c e n t  es t imates .  If to ta l  costs remain 
constant ,  th is  means  less  money c a n  be spent  o n  t h e  
su r face  and nea r  s u r f a c e  layers.  This i s  to t h e  e x t r e m e  
dissatisfaction of t h e  res idents  who have  asked members  of 
t h e  Chemist ry  Shop to inves t igate  whether  th is  s t rong  ' 
concern fo r  d e e p  groundwater  quali ty by t h e  author i t ies  
might be somewhat  unbalanced. A risk trade-off issue has  
risen t o  t h e  t o p  of t h e  agenda.  
A t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e  ( J a n u a r y - ~ a y  1984) t h e  res ident  
representa t ives  in t h e  off ic ia l  working group w e r e  designing 
plans t h a t  might sa t i s fy  t h e  provincial author i t ies  at lower 
costs s o  t h a t  measures  could a lso  be  di rec ted at t h e  s u r f a c e  
layer,  i.e. t h e  execut ion of t h e  s t r u c t u r e  plan (57). 
Interest ingly t h e  municipality appears  at t h e  moment  to be 
on  t h e  s ide  of t h e  residents, perhaps because  of f inancial  
in teres ts ,  but  possibly a l so  because  inst i tut ionally a 
municipality has  l i t t l e  concern  fo r  g rea te r  dep th  groundwater 
quality, but  does  have  a n  in te res t  in t h e  es tabl ishment  of 
a politically popular park. 
W e  see t h a t  t h e  a c t u a l  concerns  of a group involved in a soil pollution 
case may change considerably following ex te rna l  shocks and surprises. 
Although t h e  generally a c c e p t e d  issue i s  public heal th  which may s t a y  
formally cen t ra l ,  t h e  rea l  issues at hand might diverge. For t h e  res idents  
around t h e  Gr i f t  pa rk  t h e  availability of t h e  park f o r  neighbourhood 
aci t iv i t ies  seems  t o  be t h e  crucia l  point. The municipality i s  on  t h e  s ide  of 
t h e  neighbourhood as long as th i s  s tand i s  financially feasible. Provincial 
author i t ies  a r e  mostly concerned with t h e  risk t o  t h e  groundwater. 
In t h e  Merwedepolder case discussed below, w e  see t h e  s a m e  sh i f t  f rom t h e  
official  issue of public hea l th  to o t h e r  underlying issues. An in teres t ing 
f e a t u r e  of t h e  Merwedepolder case i s  t h a t  t h e  local  ac t ion  group (VAVM) 
had a c h a r a c t e r  which was  in some  ways dist inctly d i f fe ren t  f rom t h e  Gif 
commi t t ee .  
The Merwede polder 
The Merwedepolder i s  a residential  a r e a  of Dordrecht,  a middle 
sized town n e a r  t h e  l a rges t  Dutch pet rochemical  area .  When t h e  
municipality planned th i s  residential  a r e a  during t h e  sixties 
severa l  sec t ions  of t h e  Merwedepolder w e r e  exploited as 
landfills. This exploi ta t ion was at t h a t  t i m e  under municipal 
responsibility and  was  only part ly licensed under t h e  Nuisance 
Act. These landfills w e r e  f i l led with household ref use, harbour 
sludge, chemica l  waste ,  etc. Dumping ended in 1971. In 1974, 
residential  building began, and in 1975, t h e  whole a r e a  was  a 
middle-class housing d i s t r i c t  (58). Almost f r o m  t h e  t i m e  t h e  
inhabitants moved i n t o  t h e  houses t h e r e  w e r e  complaints  about  
s t ench  and hea l th  problems. There  w e r e  also complaints  about  
const ruct ion shortcomings of t h e  houses, thought t o  be caused 
by sagging of uti l i ty pipes. The complaints  las ted ,  y e t  according 
to t h e  res idents  w e r e  never  taken seriously: 'you a r e  living on  
a dumping ground t h a t  always st inkst  (59). 
When in May 1980, t h e  municipal energy board inspected t h e  
na tu ra l  gas  pipes, t h e s e  pipes appeared to b e  discoloured at 
s o m e  spots. A t  t h e  reques t  of t h e  Regional Inspection of t h e  
Environment, t h e  groundwater was analyzed.  The  groundwater 
contained smal l  quant i t ies  of compounds I t that  d o  n o t  belong 
there" (aromat ics  and t e t ra ) .  
A special  investigation was considered necessary,  however, i t  
was  concluded t h a t  t h e r e  was no  reason f o r  worry. When, t h e  
a i r  in t h e  ce l l a r s  was  analyzed,  none of these  compounds w e r e  
d e t e c t e d  and n o  fu r the r  research was considered necessary. 
Somewhat l a t e r  t h e  foundations of t h r e e  houses were  inspected 
because  of complaints  about  sagging. This inspection had to  be 
stopped because  of unbearable  stench.  Groundsamples f rom these  
houses w e r e  analyzed and  were  measured to contain 25% 
benzoic acid,  10% phenol and 10% a r o m a t i c  compounds: i t  was 
r a t h e r  pure1 chemical  waste.  
This discovery was  quickly relayed t o  t h e  Aldermen, and t h e  
following day  t h e  responsible Alderman addressed t h e  inhabitants 
in person. According to t h e  municpality "on September  17,1983 
t h e  Merwede polder problem was  born" (59). 
The  inhabitants of t h e  polder immediately r e a c t e d  by forming 
a n  act ion c o m m i t t e e  which was  l a t e r  t ransformed in to  a n  
associat ion cal led  VAVM. This associat ion was allowed to 
par t i c ipa te  in t h e  municipal technical  group o n  t h e  
Merwedepolder. Soon a f t e r  t h e  was te  discovery i t  became c lear  
t h a t  t h e  pollution was  n o t  l imited to a few houses. A deep 
controversy  emerged  between t h e  municipality, which wanted a 
careful ly  planned approach based o n  thorough investigations, and 
t h e  residents,  who wanted a quick clean up. This municipal 
approach i s  c lear ly  d ic ta ted  by inst i tut ional  uncertainty. 
A g rea t  number of investigations were  ca r r i ed  out. Their results  
l e f t  room f o r  many, o f t e n  contrary,  interpretat ions.  For 
ins tance ,  based on  t h e  resul ts  of a soil survey, t h e  government 
proclaimed c e r t a i n  a r e a s  to be clean. Yet ,  in those  Icleanv 
a r e a s  inhabitants repeatedly  dug up barrels  containing chemical  
w a s t e  (601, which deepened dis t rus t  of t h e  population towards 
governmental  activi t ies.  
In t h e  Merwedepolder t h e  presence of chemical  w a s t e  caused 
severe  socia l  and  emot ional  problems among t h e  inhabitants. 
Both municipality and VAVM w e r e  ap t  to underes t imate  these  
problems. The municipal author i t ies  dea l t  with them as 
individual cases having n o  relat ion with t h e  chemica l  was te  (61). 
The  result  of t h e  investigations m a d e  c l e a r  t h a t  a larger  pa r t  
of t h e  a r e a  was  more  o r  less polluted. The provincial aldermen 
ordered demolit ion of t h e  houses in pa r t  of t h e  a r e a  but no t  
of t h e  nearby home fo r  elderly people. The main reason was  
t h a t  these  houses would not  be ab le  to  s tand  t h e  isolation 
measures  intended. Demolition began in April 1984. 
A t o t a l  c lean up was  considered by t h e  VAVM to be less 
feasible d u e  t o  t h e  vas t  dimensions of t h e  pollution. Therefore,  
i t s  demands shi f ted  f rom clean u p  towards  a f r e e  choice of 
living place f o r  t h e  inhabitants. They did n o t  f ee l  f r e e  to  move 
because  generally t h e  houses w e r e  heavily mortgaged.  Because 
nobody buys a house buil t  upon poison, t h e  m a r k e t  value  of 
t h e s e  houses wen t  down to virtually zero. Cen t ra l  government 
f inally r e a c t e d  by enabling t h e  municipality of Dordrecht part ly 
to indemnify t h e  inhabitants.  
So underlying t h e  Merwedepolder c a s e  a s  given shape by 
VAVM, was  t h e  issue of houseowners who wanted to  be 
indemnified. 
Organisation of t h e  ac t ion  
In t h e  Merwedepolder case, in con t ras t  t o  t h e  Gri f tpark  case, w e  see a 
division between di f ferent  groups of residents. Whereas in t h e  Griftpark 
case t h e  connections of t h e  Gif commi t tee  with t h e  r e s t  of t h e  socially 
mixed neighbourhood w e r e  very strong, and measures w e r e  t aken  t o  
s t rengthen them even  fur ther ,  t h e  very ac t ive  c o m m i t t e e  VAVM in a 
middle c lass  a r e a  al ienated itself somewhat  f rom t h e  r e s t  of t h e  residents. 
The VAVM wanted t o  mobilize t h e  inhabitants, demanding f rom t h e  
municipality both a n  explanation and a quick solution (61). The VAVM, 
which was s t ruc tu red  hierachically, was s t a r t e d  by some inhabitants of t h e  
a r e a  with seriously sagged houses. These inhabitants formed t h e  board of 
t h e  VAVM which was represented in every VAVM working group. The 
association s t a r t e d  t o  gain exper t ise  in various fields, par t ly  from t h e  
outside, but t o  a large  e x t e n t  f rom i t s  own members  in o rder  t o  support 
t h e  exper t  negotiat ion s t ra tegy  chosen t o  approach t h e  local  goverment (62). 
Every c o n t a c t  with t h e  outside Merwedepolder world was  t o  be conducted 
via t w o  members  of t h e  VAVM board, which had a s t rong influence on  t h e  
VAVM s t ra tegy  d u e  t o  i t s  advantage in information and t h e  s t rong  wish of 
t h e  inhabi tants  t o  form a united front.  The board managed, fo r  instance,  t o  
delay t h e  format ion of a tennants  group. The in teres ts  of house owners and 
tennants  w e r e  no t  ent i re ly  t h e  s a m e  (62). 
The alienation of t h e  board gave  rise t o  all kinds of e x t r a  init iat ives of 
inhabitants t h a t  were  only re luctant ly  acknowledged by t h e  board. Striking 
init iat ives included t h e  refusal  t o  pay municipal taxes,  t o  pay r e n t ,  and t h e  
occupation of t h e  Dordrecht Ci ty  Administration and  t h e  Communal Health 
Service (62). 
In a sense  th i s  resembled t h e  si tuation in t h e  Volgermeerpolder. There  t h e  
Burger C o m i t e e  (BC) concen t ra ted  i t s  ac t iv i t ies  o n  collecting exper t  
knowledge and on  legal  actions. More than  once  i t  was  suggested t h a t  t h e  
BC did no t  keep  in touch with t h e  o ther  inhabitants I. I t  has been 
A program was broadcast  in which t h e  gap between BC and  t h e  local  
population was emphasized. I t  seems  t h a t  preparation for t h e  broadcast  
i tself  diminished what gap  existed (41). 
39 
suggested (amongst o the rs  by t h e  BC itself)  t h a t  t h e  supposed gap  between 
BC and o ther  inhabitants was  t h e  mot ive  behind t h e  municipality of 
Amsterdam organizing a n  informat ion meeting. At this meet ing t h e  a la rm 
among t h e  local  people appeared t o  be much g r e a t e r  than e i t h e r  t h e  BC o r  
t h e  municipality of Amsterdam had imagined (41). Yet ,  t h e  Municipality of 
Amsterdam sti l l  refused t o  close t h e  t i p  even  though t h e  Inspectorate  f o r  
t h e  Environment supported closure. Tension among t h e  inhabitants of t h e  
a r e a  ran s o  high t h a t  cables  of bridges were  c u t  several t imes  t o  prevent  
boats  loaded with refuse  t o  c o m e  near  t h e  tip. The BC was agains t  such 
illegal ac t iv i t ies  (40). 
An important  f e a t u r e  a l l  t h r e e  cases i s  t h a t  t h e  inhabitants w e r e  ab le  t o  
organize themselves effect ively .  Although th i s  in i tself ,  s e e m s  vital, 
apparently di f ferent  types  of organisations c a n  be effective.  
In t h e  Merwedepolder, a hierarchical  organization with a s t rong c e n t r a l  
group was formed, which a l ienated itself f rom t h e  backbenchers of t h e  
involved inhabitants. These backbenchers dissented somet imes  in 
spontaneous operations, which at f i r s t  c a m e  as a surprise t o  t h e  c e n t r a l  
group but af terwards  w e r e  recognized as a par t  of t h e  t o t a l  action.  In t h e  
Volgermeerpolder t h e  organizat ion was not  directed t o  mobilizing t h e  
population at large. I t  was  m o r e  of a n  exper t  group of which t h e  main a im 
(closing down t h e  refuse  t ip)  was  supported by t h e  other  inhabitants. In t h e  
Gri f tpark  case no c lea r  dist inction c a n  be  made  between t h e  ac t ion  group 
and o ther  inhabitants. The group had a very horizontal s t r u c t u r e  and a s ize  
and composition t h a t  varied with t i m e  (somewhat t o  t h e  annoyance of t h e  
municipal sec re ta ry  f o r  environmental  a f fa i r s  - a civil se rvan t  - who did 
not  always know whom t o  address). No dissenters appear  in t h e  Gri f tpark  
which may part ly be due  t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  th i s  ac t ion group, besides 
tackling t h e  author i t ies  wi th  technical  discussion and more  o r  less  formal  
opposition, also engaged in m o r e  visible and,  t o  t h e  layman, more  appealing 
manifestat ions like a demonstra t ion and a n  exhibition in which a l l  
inhabitants,  and not  only exper ts ,  could part icipate.  The groups in 
Volgermeerpolder and Merwedepolder, themselves,  did no t  use such 
demonstrations (other t h a n  public meet ings  and petitions); perhaps th i s  
inspired dissenters t o  t a k e  ac t ion  (e.g. in t h e  Merwedepolder t h e  occupat ion 
of t h e  town hall). 
Expertise 
A str iking similari ty of t h e  t h r e e  cases i s  t h e  abil i ty of t h e  ac t ion  groups 
t o  mobilize exper t ise ,  not  only exper t ise  concerning formal  procedures and 
knowledge about  state institutions, but a lso  technical  sc ient i f ic  expertise. 
This exper t i se  c a n  be present in t h e  members  of t h e  act ion group, o r  c a n  
be hired in e.g. t h e  Chemistry Shop in t h e  Gri f tpark  case. The assembled 
exper t ise  proved t o  be highly e f fec t ive  in countering t h e  scientif ic 
a rguments  put f o r t h  by t h e  authorit ies;  t h e  act ion groups repeatedly 
demonstra ted t h a t  "scientifically justified" reassurances of t h e  author i t ies  
w e r e  not  valid. This undermined t h e  author i ty  of t h e  official  bodies, and 
f e d  distrust. The exper t ise  seems  t o  have been recrui ted in search of t h e  
bleakest  possible in terpreta t ion of t h e  scan ty  d a t a ,  probably as a react ion 
t o  t h e  opt imis t ic  in terpreta t ion put  forward by t h e  officials. 
Not only i s  t h e  abil i ty t o  eva lua te  official  sc ient i f ic  repor ts  important ,  but 
a lso  access t o  scientists ,  scientif ic l i tera ture ,  and  insti tutions helps t o  
fo rmula te  a l t e rna t ive  arguments.  In t h e  Gri f tpark  case, t h e  chemical  
analysis of soil samples by t h e  chemist ry  shop confronted t h e  author i t ies  
with d a t a  t h a t  were  more  serious than  the i r  own and not less  legit imate.  
In general ,  t h e  ac t ion  groups had information available ear l ier  than t h e  
author i t ies ,  o r  t h e  resul ts  of investigations were  known before  publicatin by 
a municipality. The mobilization of exper t ise  seems t o  have been of crucial  
importance fo r  a n  act ion group t o  remain in tac t ,  when facing a body of 
sc ient i f ic  information forwarded by authorit ies.  Howev, when exper t ise  i s  
used as a weapon, t h e  d e b a t e  tends  t o  become a technical  and  lengthy 
dispute between experts.  Arguments cannot  be understood o r  checked, and 
unless t h e  exper t s  t r ans la te  t h e  con ten t  of t h e  dispute fo r  t h e  laymen, 
t h e r e  i s  n o  way of knowing if t h e r e  is any  progress in t h e  mat te r .  This 
may  be o n e  cause  f o r  t h e  "dissident" act ion seen  in t h e  Merwede case. 
Another e f f e c t  c a n  be t h a t  t h e  public loses in te res t  in t h e  case. In t h e  
Gri f tpark  case, t h e  ac t ion  group recognized th i s  and  deliberately organized 
t h e  demonstrations,  not only t o  put  pressure t o  t h e  authorit ies,  but  also t o  
res to re  t h e  feelin in t h e  public t h a t  i s  was thei r  business. 
Toxicological evaluat ion of t h e  pollution s i tuat ion 
In Volgermeerpolder and Merwedepolder toxicological  evaluations of t h e  
pollutants were  ca r r i ed  out. As discussed in t h e  Volgermeerpolder case t h e  
main issue was  t h e  d i f fe rence  in t h e  norm to  be  set fo r  dioxin. This norm 
was considered re levan t  because t h e  e s t i m a t e d  maximum individual dose  of 
ingested dioxin was  in  t h e  s a m e  o rder  of magni tude as t h a t  which i s  
considered acceptable .  
However, t h e  uncer ta in t ies  in t h e  sc ient i f ic  informat ion backing t h e  original 
1 3  pg norm set by RI, were  qui te  large. When th i s  norm was shown to  be  
lower t h a n  t h e  e s t i m a t e d  population dose  a revised norm was set. 
The official  bodies did not  ,however, concede  t h e s e  uncer ta in t ies  in thei r  
argumentation.  The keenness of t h e  off ic ia l  bodies in  t h e  Volgermeerpolder 
c a s e  t o  c r e a t e  and use new information c o n t r a s t s  with t h e  use t h a t  was  
made  (or, r a t h e r  no t  made)  of toxicological  conclusions in t h e  
Merwedepolder . 
The public risk of t h e  soil pollution in t h e  Merwedepolder was  evaluated by 
a so cal led  independent commi t t ee .  Members of t h e  c o m m i t t e e  included, 
amongst  o thers ,  t w o  of t h e  most  prominent Dutch  sc ien t i s t s  in t h e  f ields of 
toxicology and soil pollution. This c o m m i t t e e  was  fo rmed  a f t e r  t h e  
Provincial Aldermen's  decision to level  all t h e  houses in  a c e r t a i n  a r e a ,  
excluding t h e  home f o r  elderly. This s e e m e d  s t r a n g e  t o  t h e  board of t h a t  
home, so they invited t h e  e x p e r t  c o m m i t t e e  to  e v a l u a t e  t h e  governmental  
research.  
The exper t  c o m m i t t e e  did so by compar ing t h e  measured pollution levels in 
t h e  ce l lars  of t h e  houses in  t h e  Merwedepolder wi th  both local  open a i r  
and with t h e  concentra t ions  found in a s tudy  of t h e  indoor-environment of 
133 houses in Ede (a town in t h e  province of Gelderland). From th i s  
comparison t h e  c o m m i t t e e  concluded t h a t  only nine of t h e  109 condemned 
houses w e r e  slightly polluted, and t h e  r e s t  w e r e  considered clean.  The f inal  
conclusion of t h e  c o m m i t t e e  was  t h a t  in  th is  pa r t  of t h e  Merwedepolder 
most  people w e r e  n o t  exposed to  pollution of a n y  impor tance  (63). The 
concentra t ion of t w o  pollutants, benzene and  te t rachloroethylene,  
w e r e  compared t o  toxicological da ta .  The  te t rachloroethylene 
concentra t ions  found in t h e  Merwedepolder, f o r  ins tance ,  w e r e  t w o  t o  f i v e  
t i m e s  lower t h a n  t h e  concentra t ions  d e t e c t a b l e  in  t h e  exhala t ion a i r  of 
people living in t h e  neighbourhood of d r y  c lean firms.  This example  was  
explici t ly m e a n t  t o  show t h a t  at other  places in t h e  Netherlands people 
w e r e  exposed to  much  worse,  but generally a c c e p t e d ,  levels  of pollution 
(63). This method of comparison re f l ec t s  t h e  implici t  assumption of t h e  
c o m m i t t e e ,  namely t h a t  t h e s e  o t h e r  types  of pollution w e r e  acceptable .  
From both  comparisons t h e  e x p e r t  c o m m i t t e e  d rew t h e  conclusion t h a t  
t h e r e  exis ted  no d i r e c t  t h r e a t  to human health.  Y e t ,  t h e  province 
considered c lean  u p  measures  necessary because t h e  absence of t h r e a t  could 
no t  be  guaran teed  in t h e  long run. If t h e  province had agreed  to a more  
speci f ic  c l ean  u p  a s  was  proposed by t h e  e x p e r t  c o m m i t t e e ,  i t  would have 
increased i t s  own uncer ta in ty  o n  t h e  consequences of i t s  own decisions. 
The Merwedepolder was  a l ready considered to  be  a c a s e  fo r  c lean up, 
because  t e s t  values of contaminia t ion had exceeded  those  of t h e  regulatory 
t e s t  framework.  If, following t h e  experts1 repor t ,  t h e  province had decided 
agains t  c l ean  up, t h e n  t h e  validity of t h e  whole test f ramework  would have 
been publicly th rown i n t o  doubt. In addition, a f inal  decision to t a k e  
measures  had a l ready been made,  and fo r  psychological reasons a r e t r e a t  
would not  have been acceptable .  
We see t h a t ,  in p rac t i ce ,  t h e  normset t ing f ramework  does no t  se rve  a s  a n  
eva lua t ive  yardstick fo r  t o x i c  e f fec t s ,  bu t  r a t h e r  helps to  distinguish those 
cases  where  i m m e d i a t e  measures  a r e  called f o r  f rom those  where  such 
measures  c a n  wait .  When a c a s e  becomes a major concern  o t h e r  yardsticks 
a r e  used to  eva lua te  t h e  potential  risks to  public health.  The f ramework 
has  t h e  funct ion to  pinpoint those  cases  w h e r e  ac t ion  i s  legitimized. 
Therefore,  if a n  a c t i o n  group suspects  serious soil pollution, t h e n  i t  should 
show t h a t  t h e r e  i s  cause  f o r  concern  by proving t h a t  o n e  o r  m o r e  C values 
have been surpassed. Only t h e n  does t h e  process of negotiat ion really begin. 
The t e s t  f r amework  has  t h e  funct ion t h a t  a threshold i s  s e t  f o r  Iallowed' 
cases.  
An impor tan t  e f f e c t  of t h e  t e s t  f ramework might be to  sc reen  t h e  cases  
which deserve  a t t en t ion ,  the reby  reducing t h e  procedural  uncertainties.  It is 
possible t h a t  a number  of p a s t  ac t iv i t ies  with respec t  to  soil c lean u p  
might,  wi th  hindsight, have had t h e  function of developing s tandard 
procedures in th is  new policy f ield,  which e rup ted  s o  suddenly a f t e r  t h e  
discovery of Lekkerkerk.  
Summary and discussion 
In e a c h  soil pollution c a s e  scientif ic and behavioural uncertainties abound. I t  
i s  impossible t o  de te rmine  t h e  bounderies of t h e  sys tem at issue. Is a n  
a r e a  c lean if no measurements  have been taken o r  should i t  be considered 
otherwise if a pollution has  been found nearby? No agreed-upon 
extrapolations have been found. The level of pollution measured may 
f l u c t u a t e  widely, as i s  even  more  t r u e  f o r  t h e  toxicological evaluations. In 
qu i te  a number of cases t h e r e  i s  no agreement  on t h e  in terpreta t ion of t h e  
available data .  This i s  not only due t o  t h e  sc ient i f ic  uncertainties,  but  also 
because no standardized and agreed upon evaluation procedures exis t ,  as w e  
saw with respect  t o  t h e  pollution levels in t h e  Gr i f t  park and t h e  
evaluation of t h e  toxicological si tuation in t h e  Merwedepolder. Different 
institutionalised t radi t ions  of theory and methods c r e a t e  d i f fe ren t  evaluative 
f rameworks  which generally generates  scientif ic uncer ta inty  . 
The par t ies  involved choose di f ferent  combinations of t h e  scant ly  available 
da ta ,  thereby making cases which might not  hold up  agains t  fu r the r  
evidence but which cannot  be refuted by t h e  d a t a  available. From t h e  f a c t  
t h a t  t h e  potential  in take level of people living around t h e  Volgermeerpolder 
was not  disputed, whereas  t h e  carcinogenity of dioxin was, we can  see how 
haphazard possible points of dispute can be (64). Therefore  we can  say t h a t  
in s o m e  ways dispute generates  uncertainty. 
In t h e  dioxin case w e  saw t h a t  not a l l  - possible points a r e  indeed debated.  
Some a r e  chosen for discussion and others ,  though suitable candidates  for 
d e b a t e  in principle, a r e  l e f t  out .  The initial positions of t h e  par t ies  
involved seem t o  be important  in t h a t  choice. 
In soil pollution cases not  only scientif ic uncer ta int ies  a r e  ubiquitous, but 
also institutional uncertainties.  As seen in t h e  case studies,  t h e r e  exist  no 
standard procedures t o  deal  with soil pollution. We c a n  see, however, t h a t  
bureaucracies t r ied  t o  reduce institutional uncer ta int ies  in a number of 
ways. One example was t h e  standard framework which, in theory,  enabled 
t h e  part icipants t o  decide  unambiguously whether  a soil pollution case was 
worth fur ther  investigation. In pract ice  i t  operated as a d e  minimus 
threshold for t h e  negotiat ion of more  complex in te res t s ,  perceptions 
and agendas around the  focus of 'public health r i s k ' .  
In addition, defining t h e  problem as a public heal th  issue set in to  gear  a 
c e r t a i n  t y p e  of bureaucratic ratonali ty,  which, in turn,  determined which 
types  of scientif ic uncertainty were  open for  debate .  
More immediate  measures a r e  t aken  when a familiar  type  of react ion is 
called for ,  as for instance, in those  cases where  wate r  supply was at s take.  
On t h e  o ther  hand, t h e  authorit ies procras t inate  in those si tuations where 
no famil iar  procedures exist, o r  where  thei r  ac t ions  would c r e a t e  fu r the r  
insti tutional uncertainties. In those  s i tuat ions  t h e  governmental  bodies 
concerned must shape t h e  problem and i t s  management  Ion t h e  spot1.  Their 
ac t ions  a r e  then driven by more  general  concerns like pacifying residents, 
avoiding negative publicity, and avoiding unforeseen financial  obligations. 
Although t h e  public views soil pollution as a risk management  problem, t h e  
deta i led  s t ruc tu re  of t h e  problem may be very di f ferent  fo r  local  
government and residents, t h e  l a t t e r  of whom a r e  concerned primarily with 
thei r  immedia te  surroundings. To t h e m ,  soil pollution may represent  not  only 
a t h r e a t  t o  their  health but a lso  t o  the i r  s tandard of living generally. In 
t h e  Griftpark case, for instance,  t h e  pollution was  not  perceived as a n  
immedia te  and unavoidable t h r e a t  t o  l i fe  and limb. Also for  local  
government t h e  'public health problem1 h a s  d i f fe ren t  overtones,  mainly of a 
f inancial  character .  
Therefore  on t h e  surface  i t  may s e e m  as if a l l  those  concerned with soil 
pollution view t h e  issue in t h e  s a m e  way, whereas  on  closer inspection they 
d o  not. The way dif ferent  groups deal  with e a c h  other  in a soil pollution 
case i s  no t  only shaped by thei r  respect ive  problem definitions but  a lso  by 
t h e  way they  in terpret  their  possible reactions.  These react ions  were  no t  
only given form by t h e  Lekkerkerk incident and t h e  ensuing regulation, but  
a lso  by variable concre te  local histories of ac t ion  between governmental  
bodies and residents. In t h e  t h r e e  cases discussed here  history 
involved a n  ear l ier  confrontation c rea t ing  dis t rus t  between t h e  t w o  local  
part ies.  
The groups discussed in our cases s e e m  t o .  'have been e f fec t ive  in 
influencing problem definitions and decision f o r c e  because of a number of 
comparable  features.  They w e r e  a l l  highly s t ructured and had access t o  
sc ient i f ic  expertise. The e x a c t  organisational form of t h e  ac t ion  group did 
no t  seem t o  m a t t e r  in relat ion t o  effect iveness ;  i t  did, however, m a t t e r  
for  t h e  way t h e  act ion group was viewed by t h e  o ther  residents. For i t s  
ef fect iveness  a n  important f e a t u r e  appeared  t o  be t h e  development  of 
a l te rna t ive  policy solutions t o  t h e  soil pollution, which could be  asserted in 
negotiations with t h e  authorities. If neither t h e  authorit ies nor t he  local 
group have a l ternat ives  available for  debate ,  a l l  o ther  actions lose their  
effectiveness.  
4. Conclusions 
Hazardous was te  legislation, as well a s  legislation in other  areas ,  is  not t h e  
s ta r t ing  point for  government policy but  a way of directing a n  a r e a  in 
which history has  already partly been writ ten.  Future  act ion which i s  based 
on  fo rmer  behaviour and experience is  only partly shaped by t h e  formal 
legislation. In comparing t h e  Dutch policy fields of chemical was te  
Trea tment  and Disposal and soil pollution, i t  i s  striking how much t h e  
l a t t e r  provoked alarm and participation of t h e  local population, although t he  
physical problems a r e  similar. For instance,  t h e  severe  s tench problems and 
o ther  hazards  t o  public health connected with t h e  operation of EMK seem 
comparable  with t h e  risks of living on  polluted soil. This points t o  t h e  f a c t  
t h a t  o ther  fac to rs  influence t h e  way in which a problem becomes a 
c o n c r e t e  issue. The chemical waste  problem is strongly connected with 
industry 's  general  in teres t  in an  undisturbed and unregulated market.  
Policies t h a t  result  in high costs  for hazardous waste  T dr D or  in terfere  
with production routes  a r e  generally not welcomed by industry. 
The Induval plan, fo r  instance, was intended t o  c r ea t e  a legal a l ternat ive  
t o  t h e  dumping of hazardous waste  following enac tment  of t h e  Chemical 
Waste Act. The government also reckons with industry's in teres ts  in 
enact ing laws. Although reducing and preventing dangers fo r  t h e  
neighbourhood is a legi t imate  governmental  function, we see t h a t  e.g. in 
t h e  (non-)implementation of t h e  Nuisance Act,  o f t e n  a weak compromise 
was s t ruck  between industrial growth and a s a f e  environment. With respec t  
t o  soil pollution such a divergence of in teres ts  seems,  at leas t  at f i r s t  
sight,  not  t o  exist ,  s ince no-one appears t o  oppose reducing risks t o  public 
health. Here,  however, t h e  balance i s  s t ruck  between public health o n  t h e  
o n e  hand and c lean up cos t s  on  t h e  other.  In Lekkerkerk and t h e  
Volgermeerpolder finding t h a t  t h e  drinking wa t e r  was polluted implied a n  
unquestioned risk t o  public health,  which led t o  act ion by t h e  responsible 
institutions. Maintenance of drinking wa t e r  i s  a n  a r e a  of long-accepted 
and author i ta t ive  governmental  policy. A number of different author i t ies  
have responsibilities in th is  f ield,  and they have clearly defined responses t o  
problems. Norms for  drinking wate r  a r e  c lear  c u t  and generally accepted: in 
o t h e r  words, t h e r e  exis t  l i t t l e  o r  no institutional uncertainties.  
Implementation of t h e  Nuisance Act i s  somewhat different.  Similar, 
however,  i s  t h a t  many a r e a s  covered by this act a r e  generally accep ted  and 
t h e r e  a r e  c learcut  responsibilities of government, especially in what  i s  
ca l led  'nuisance in a s t r i c t  sense1,  where detailed regulations exist  t h a t  c a n  
be easily implemented I. However, t h e  Nuisance Act has been used t o  
cover  continuously shifting a reas ,  and i t  is especially t h e  newer a reas ,  like 
hazardous was te  (but a lso  new technologies) in which institutional 
uncer ta int ies  pervade and paralyse official  action. 
Returning t o  t h e  question why soil pollution became a burning public issue 
whereas  chemical  was te  did not,  i t  may be re levant  t h a t  t h e  main 
consideration for  cleaning up soil  pollution is a f inancial  one;  t h e r e  a r e  no 
insti tutionalized in teres ts  preventing act ion in th is  field, as exis t  f o r  
chemical  waste. This observation suggests t h a t  issues only e m e r g e  as public 
concerns  when t h e r e  is  some feeling t h a t  they  a r e  t r ac tab le ;  if deeper  
fo rces  a r e  at work making them res is tant  t o  policy manipulations, t h e  
public agenda re f l ec t s  a pragmat ic  orientation and looks e lsewhere  for over t  
concerns. 
E.g. t h e  regulation for  a s to rage  tank fo r  oil. 
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